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Introduction
This book deals with climate change and energy problems and is the result of 
research cooperation within the unit Energy, Transport and Environment at 
the Center of Economic Studies of the K.U.Leuven. The research unit consists 
of academics and researchers of the K.U.Leuven Association (HUBrussel and 
Faculty of Economics and Business – K.U.Leuven). 
Climate Change is a long term environmental problem at world scale. In order 
to limit climate change, strong reductions of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emis-
sions are required. As the carbon emissions associated to fossil energy use 
are responsible for the bulk of the GHG emissions, this will require vigorous 
actions on the energy front. One will need strong energy saving actions as 
well as a substitution of fossil energy by non fossil, renewable energy sources. 
The book consists of five contributed chapters. As climate change is an inter-
national policy problem, the two first chapters are contributions by internati-
onal experts in the field of climate change, technology and renewables policy. 
The three other chapters discuss energy and climate policy questions at the 
Belgian and Flanders level. 
In the first chapter Carolyn Fischer (Resources for the Future, Washington 
DC) outlines some core principles for guiding the design of clean technology 
policies, with a focus on energy. She points out the necessary ingredients for a 
successful clean technology policy. The first is a strong pricing signal that car-
bon emissions are costly, this can take the form of a tradable emissions scheme 
or a carbon tax. The second is to create an environment where the market 
picks the right new technologies. This includes removing distorting subsidies 
and barriers to competition and supporting R&D broadly. Supporting R&D 
for new energy technologies may require some specific measures. One of the 
difficult questions is the role of the government in allocating research funds. 
The author shows that when the government lacks the impartiality and exper-
tise for the allocation of research funds, there exist alternative mechanisms. 
In the second chapter, Karsten Neuhoff (University of Cambridge, DIW Ber-
lin) analyzes in more debt the European Renewables Directive. This directive 
requires Member States to deliver by 2020 on average 20% of their final energy 
consumption using renewable energy sources. To deliver this target, Member 
States have to adjust not only their renewable pricing and subsidy policies but 
also many other policy dimensions. These include adapted planning procedu-
res, a check of the energy market design, provide grid and supply infrastruc-
ture, and implement support schemes that limit regulatory risk for finance. 
A failure to pursue any one of these changes risks the successful deployment 
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of renewables. The chapter analyzes how quantitative policy indicators can 
allow governments to measure and manage the successful implementation of 
all these policy dimensions to deliver the renewable energy targets. The indi-
cators need to be designed so that they can focus on individual components of 
the policy framework. Then they can measure whether the envisaged annual 
deployment level of a technology is compatible with the framework in place 
in a country. Increased transparency provided by policy indicators facilitates 
management of policy implementation, enhances accountability of govern-
ments and can inform the reporting of Member States to the European Com-
mission. This allows technology companies to have confidence in projected 
deployment levels and triggers private sector investment in the supply chain 
to provide the necessary production capacity.
The chapter of Johan Eyckmans & Sandra Rousseau (HUBrussel and 
K.U.Leuven) analyzes the allocation of tradable carbon emission permits in 
Belgium, more particularly the allocation to installations for the first phase 
(2005-2007) of the EU ETS. Interesting about Belgium is that its National Al-
location Plan is the sum of three different regional allocation plans because 
environmental policy has to a large extent been regionalized. The data shows 
that, overall, Belgian installations have been allocated long, i.e. have been gi-
ven more allowances than what they need to cover their verified emissions, 
during all years of Phase 1.
Johan Eyckmans & Guido Pepermans (HUBrussel and K.U.Leuven) study 
in their chapter the contentious issue of the use of nuclear power stations 
in Belgium. They sketch advantages and disadvantages of particular policy 
options, and include in their trade-offs issues of market power in the electri-
city market, external costs of power generation technologies and security of 
supply. 
In the fifth chapter, Wouter Nijs (VITO) and Denise Van Regemorter 
(K.U.Leuven), use the Belgian TIMES model to study the costs of the rene-
wable energy target for Belgium and its interactions with the climate policy 
targets. TIMES is a techno-economic optimisation model which assembles, 
in a simple market context, technological information (conversion efficiency, 
investment and variable costs, emissions, etc.) for the entire energy system. 
With a complete model of the Belgian energy market, they show what are the 
effects of strengthening or relaxing the renewable target and the potential ef-
fects of opening the EU market for trade in green certificates. 
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Stabilizing global greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at levels to avoid sig-
nificant climate risks will require massive decarbonization of all the major 
economies over the next few decades. Additional activities will be required 
to reduce emissions from other GHGs and to promote carbon sequestration 
through soil management, afforestation, and avoided deforestation. Achie-
ving the necessary scale of emissions reductions will require a multi-faceted 
policy effort to support a broad array of technological and behavioral chan-
ges. This chapter outlines some core principles for guiding the design of clean 
technology policies, with a focus on energy.
1. Carbon pricing is a technology policy
At the core of any cost-effective approach must be a strong and increasing pri-
ce signal across the entire economy that carbon emissions are costly. Emissi-
ons pricing can be implemented either through a carbon tax or a broad-based 
cap-and-trade system. The reason for a primary reliance on carbon pricing is 
twofold.
First, technologies are only useful if people want to use them. While social 
values may influence some folks to become early adopters of hybrid cars or 
compact-fluorescent light bulbs, financial self-interest is the primary driver 
of such decisions for most participants in a market economy. Carbon pricing 
makes clean technologies more cost-competitive, which provides “market 
pull” by encouraging their adoption. Greater potential for uptake in turn en-
courages the private sector to innovate improvements and alternatives. Thus, 
carbon pricing reduces some of the need for reliance on public innovation 
programs targeted specifically toward clean energy, as the market has more 
incentive to contribute. Furthermore, carbon pricing ensures that public spen-
ding on “market push” strategies of research, development, and deployment 
(RD&D) ultimately has greater impact, by increasing demand for these tech-
nologies.1 
Second, many options are available for reducing emissions. Not only is there 
a huge array of technological solutions for electricity generation, production 
processes, building materials, and consumer appliances, but a variety of beha-
vioral changes can contribute to smaller emissions footprints. No command-
and-control regulation could efficiently prescribe all the appropriate activi-
ties that should be undertaken. Carbon pricing, on the other hand, creates 
incentives to do all these things: use less carbon-intensive fuels and products, 
conserve energy, and develop and deploy emissions-reducing technologies. 
1 For a broader discussion of the interaction between emissions pricing, spillovers, and public 
support for environmentally friendly technologies, see Fischer (2008).
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All of these options will compete in the marketplace, allowing decisions for 
reducing emissions to be made on the basis of cost-effectiveness. Further-
more, when cost-effective reductions are taken in the near term with current 
technologies, some pressure is lifted on the speed and depth of technological 
change needed in the future to reach a long-term cumulative emissions goal.2
Technological change and turnover will be essential for deep reductions; ho-
wever, a lack of emissions pricing is not the only roadblock. In the following 
sections we discuss a host of other impediments to a robust market for clean 
technology RD&D: financial, regulatory, behavioral, and network barriers; 
knowledge and innovation spillovers; scale economies and other challenges. 
Furthermore, political realities may constrain the carbon price from being 
sufficiently high and credible as to induce the necessary transformation and 
innovation. Thus, while experts agree that a carbon price is necessary, few 
believe that a carbon price alone is sufficient to achieve these goals cost ef-
fectively. The carbon price should be supported by complementary policies to 
address barriers to technological development and deployment.
2.  Pick winning technology policies
Many studies have been conducted of the technological options for achieving 
deep reductions in GHG emissions. In a well-known Science article, Pacala 
and Socolow (2004), professors of ecology and engineering at Princeton Uni-
versity, introduced a now popular tool illustrating the “wedges” of potential 
reductions from available technologies to bring the emissions path to a sta-
bilization target. These kinds of studies are informative, but they focus on 
the capacity of technologies, rather than the cost-effectiveness of reduction 
options, the possibilities for innovation over time, or the role of policies in 
getting there. Economists who model climate policies, on the other hand, tend 
to focus on cost-effective solutions, but often with less technological detail. All 
models have difficulty incorporating realistic representations of technological 
change, uncertainties, barriers, and non-market-based policies. It is impor-
tant to remember that energy projections are difficult for proven technologies, 
much less emerging ones. 
In one word, a key challenge for meeting emissions and technology goals is 
“uncertainty.” We are not sure what emissions reductions will ultimately be 
needed or what the corresponding prices will be. We do not necessarily have 
2 Fischer and Newell (2008) show that, even with knowledge spillovers, policy cost-effective-
ness depends largely on the degree to which all options for reducing emissions are encour-
aged. While emissions pricing is the single most effective policy, an optimal portfolio also 
includes R&D support, achieving emission reductions at significantly lower cost than any 
single policy.
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a good idea of the costs of large-scale deployment of currently existing tech-
nologies, much less when breakthrough technologies might arrive, or to what 
degree the costs and/or quality of existing technologies will be improved. 
These kinds of uncertainties can create a tension among policy recommenda-
tions. On the one hand, policies should be as neutral as possible, to allow a 
broad range of technologies to emerge and compete, and to avoid the problem 
of governments attempting to pick winners. On the other hand, we cannot be 
fully neutral, given that we are largely aware of the major technological opti-
ons that will be available over the next decades and some technologies have 
specific barriers and specific potentials that may require targeted assistance. 
The next section discusses which kinds of problems are best addressed with 
broad support and which kinds may justify narrower policy responses.
3.  Address barriers
In a sense, the carbon price is addressing the primary barrier, which has been 
the lack of financial reward for climate-friendly behavior and technologies. 
However, additional barriers or market failures may require additional policy 
tools, and many of these need not target specific technologies.
3.1  Certain barriers lend themselves to broad and neutral policies
Supporting research. For example, the social value of research and innovation 
often surpasses what the innovators themselves can appropriate. These know-
ledge “spillovers” represent a kind of market failure, since by receiving only a 
fraction of the benefits, innovators have only a fraction of the incentive to en-
gage in the R&D. Studies of commercial innovations suggest that, on average, 
less than half of the gains to R&D return to the originator, although appro-
priation rates vary considerably over different types of innovations.3 Basic 
research, in particular, is an excellent candidate for government support, as 
the commercial applications are often distant and unknown. Other technolo-
gies may become commercially viable, but only when the carbon price is high 
enough. Although greater stringency of climate policies may be expected in 
the future, patent lifetimes are still limited. Therefore, the appropriation rates 
for climate-friendly technologies are likely to be relatively low, at least initi-
ally, and rising over time, meaning some extra support during the transition 
can help clean technology development (Gerlagh et al. 2008). Even commer-
cial innovations have spillovers—however, it is important to remember that 
spillovers are not the exclusive domain of clean energy technologies. With a 
3 See, e.g., Jones and Williams (1998). 
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carbon price in place, tax breaks and other public incentives for reflecting the 
additional social value of R&D are most efficient when they are broad-based. 
Else one risks crowding out useful innovation in other sectors.
Removing distortions. In addition to the carbon price, other policies can en-
sure that the allocation of private R&D better follows social (including envi-
ronmental) values. For instance, distorting subsidies for fossil-based energy 
should be removed. In non-OECD countries, subsidies are primarily used to 
keep consumer prices artificially low, with overconsumption as a result. If 
major developing countries would wipe out all energy subsidies, global CO2 
emissions could fall by 4-5% (IEA 2002). In OECD countries, however, most 
of these subsidies are for fossil-fuel production; for example, in the U.S., half 
of energy subsidies go to fossil fuels, compared to 5% for renewables (IEA 
2006).4 Of course, beneficiaries of subsidies will resist reform. Therefore, re-
moving subsidies may require a gradual phasing out (French coal subsidies 
were reduced in a 20-year program); transitioning to less distortionary forms 
of assistance (the U.S. replaced agricultural commodity price supports with a 
direct income support program); and educating the public about the benefits 
to rally support (IEA 2002). 
Another kind of subsidy is the lack of policy to reflect the cost of other en-
vironmental damages, besides GHG emissions. Regulating conventional air 
and water pollutants with market-based mechanisms will also help improve 
market signals and make clean energy sources relatively more competitive to 
their fossil-fuel counterparts.
Inefficient regulations, on the other hand, can impede technical progress. Un-
necessary legal and regulatory barriers that favor incumbents should be remo-
ved to allow for better competition. Unfortunately, some of the energy sectors 
most relevant for GHG reductions also involve highly concentrated, natural 
monopolies. For example, regulators of power generation, transmission and 
delivery must keep an eye on the ability of new entrants to join and compe-
te. Licensing, regulations, and interconnection procedures must be clear, not 
overly burdensome, and coordinated across jurisdictions, while allowing for 
appropriate oversight to balance potential tradeoffs in economic and environ-
mental costs. Often, streamlining regulations need not be technology-specific 
and can benefit all participants, not just new green entrants.
4 Many of these subsidies take the form of preferential tax treatment, relative to other sectors. 
For example, the oil and gas industries in the U.S. and Canada have benefited from such pro-
visions as accelerated depreciation, the expensing of exploration and development costs, and 
other investment tax breaks; direct expenditures on infrastructure and R&D; and the incom-
plete capture of resource rents through royalties—many of which disproportionately support 
the development of the relatively dirty oil sands (Taylor et al. 2005). 
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New technologies may also require explicit new policies to create regulatory 
certainty. For example, the long-term impacts of large-scale carbon capture 
and sequestration (CCS) remain uncertain, and relevant regulations, guideli-
nes, and industry protocols are needed to assign liability and develop good 
practices.
3.2  Some barriers may be general in origin, but require more 
specific attention
Information. For markets to function, they require not only good property 
rights and competition, but also information. Some product characteristics are 
easily observable, but others — like nutritional content or energy consump-
tion rates — are not available or credible without government intervention. 
By improving the availability and visibility of information, product-specific 
labels, credible reporting standards, and educational campaigns can allow 
better consumer and firm decision-making at lower costs.
Standards. Still, perfect information may not be enough. Consumer uncertain-
ty about energy prices and the quality and reliability of the new technologies 
being offered them can contribute to seemingly myopic behavior. Poor choices 
can also arise when those making decisions about the energy-using applian-
ces and building features are not the same people as those using or paying 
for the energy, such as in landlord-tenant relationships. Coping with short 
payback horizons and principal-agent problems can require product-specific 
interventions, such as energy efficiency standards, fuel-economy standards, 
and building codes. While these standards are generally informed by tech-
nological options, they need not be prescriptive of particular ways to meet 
the standards. Indeed, they should be designed so as to allow cost-effective 
alternatives and ongoing incentives for improvement.
Financing. Risk and payback horizons also influence investment decisions; if 
the private perceptions of these factors do not align with the public ones, then 
policies may be needed to assist financing and manage risks for publicly de-
sirable projects. Technologies for which capital costs are very large (such as 
nuclear, hydro, CCS) are more likely to need preferential financing or guaran-
tees to reduce private investment risks. Even wind generation has high capital 
costs relative to operating costs; however, the capacity can be expanded more 
incrementally and policies to guarantee profitable production prices has typi-
cally been used to reduce investment risk, rather than finance guarantees, alt-
hough investment tax credits are also common. Ultimately, greater certainty 
about the carbon pricing policy will also help to reduce risks and raise returns 
for low-carbon technologies, and financing interventions should focus on nar-
rowing the discrepancy between private and public payback horizons.
   13
3.3 Other barriers are specific to certain technologies
Scale economies. Economies of scale are an issue for many new technologies. 
Until enough units have penetrated the market, production costs are high and 
support services are scarce. Policies to address this barrier can legitimately 
help some new technologies gain acceptance and get off the ground, but they 
should be careful to avoid extended support for uneconomic technologies. 
An example is hybrid vehicle tax credits in the U.S., which phase out after a 
certain number of models are sold. Portfolio standards also become easier to 
meet (and credit prices fall) as scale economies are met.
Networks and infrastructure. Some technological options require new infra-
structure and support networks in order to function. However, private actors 
are reluctant to take on activities that supply public goods, and most would 
prefer to wait for someone else to do it. The resulting network externalities 
are an important cause of “path dependence” or “technological lock-in,” and 
public intervention may be required to change paths. Important examples lie 
in the distribution of fuels for transport: biofuels, hydrogen, CNG, or plug-in 
electric would require new fuel (or battery) distribution and storage equip-
ment, as well as new vehicle engines. Here it may be costly to allow multiple 
new options and thereby difficult to avoid picking a winner, so the decision 
must be made deliberately. For costly network infrastructure investments, 
there is an option value to waiting for more information, in order to be confi-
dent in betting on the technology. 
Some infrastructure investments for carbon-free generation technologies may 
also have network externalities. For example, real-time energy metering can 
allow for time-of-use pricing to better manage electricity demand. Direct cur-
rent lines in buildings could allow solar cells to power many devices without 
inverters. Upgrades to “smart grid” transmission technologies can facilitate 
the incorporation of distributed generation and intermittent renewable ener-
gy sources. However, many infrastructure investments—like transmission li-
nes for remote renewable energy sources—are better viewed as an additional 
cost to developing more capacity in those resources, although there may be 
other barriers related to siting or entry. The expansion of nuclear generation 
would require central infrastructure in the form of a waste storage facility—
which involves its own tradeoffs.
Tradeoffs. Many technologies that reduce GHGs may instead cause other en-
vironmental damages and risks. For example, nuclear generation creates 
radioactive waste and security concerns. Hydropower affects aquatic eco-
systems, fish spawning, and cultural resource access rights. Battery waste in-
volves toxic chemicals; transmission lines can disturb other land uses; most 
generation siting raises “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) issues, and the list 
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goes on. Public assessment of the tradeoffs is needed before allowing broad 
deployment. These assessments are also related to the regulatory regime for 
deploying technologies, and assuring that regime is appropriate but not un-
necessarily long or cumbersome.
4.  Certain kinds of technologies may deserve preferential 
treatment
In addition to addressing important market failures and barriers, policyma-
kers may want to direct extra attention and support to certain kinds of tech-
nologies that have special potential. Some examples of especially desirable 
technologies are those that expand options and reduce costs of reaching deep 
reductions, those that may have additional spillover benefits at home, and 
those that may have spillover benefits abroad, further reducing global emis-
sions and improving the likelihood of more globally stringent GHG agree-
ments.
Backstop technologies. As heavily emphasized in the Stern Review (2006), there 
is an important role for technology policies that focus on bringing down the 
costs of reducing carbon emissions. When the future emissions target is uncer-
tain, as well as the costs of reaching potential targets, both R&D and early 
abatement activities can facilitate the adoption of more ambitious targets and 
thus help reduce the expected costs of future abatement, adaptation, and da-
mages. However, certain kinds of R&D may also help to reduce the degree of 
uncertainty in these costs and thereby carry an extra value. 
In the climate policy case, the national or societal marginal abatement cost 
curve represents a sequence of technological options, each more costly than 
its predecessor. “Backstop” technologies are a particular kind of option. Con-
ceptually, a true backstop technology is free to be replicated at a large scale 
without scarcity constraints, meaning that marginal costs (though relatively 
high) do not increase much as capacity is expanded. The presence of backstop 
technologies helps to flatten out the upper portion of the overall marginal 
abatement curve, meaning that if stricter-than-expected emissions targets are 
necessary, carbon prices will not need to rise astronomically. In other words, 
if it turns out that climate change is even more serious than we think, and we 
need to step up emission reductions dramatically in the future, an affordable 
backstop that can be expanded to basically any scale would be invaluable. 
Therefore, given the uncertainty we face, there is an added value to bringing 
down the costs of technologies that help flatten the marginal abatement cost 
curve. Of course, another way to keep options open is by reducing emissions 
more aggressively in the near term. But if backstop technologies can keep 
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costs lower in the worst-case scenarios, expected long-term costs are also lo-
wer, and that in turn reduces pressure to engage in deeper reductions in the 
near term.5
In terms of true backstop technologies, the most-discussed candidates are car-
bon capture and storage, nuclear, and solar (and, theoretically, fusion). Each 
has the possibility of being utilized at large scales, though location (and risk 
management) could be a constraining factor. The solar energy flow to earth is 
particularly large in comparison to societal needs. RD&D programs that can 
lower costs, expand capacities, and accelerate how rapidly these capacities 
can be tapped have an added insurance value, beyond the gains that would be 
realized at the expected levels of utilization laid out in roadmaps. 
Comparative advantage. Countries may have national RD&D policies, but the 
development of new technologies is a global effort. Consequently, there may 
be opportunities for coordination (or free-riding, for that matter) and for 
specialization. Technology oriented agreements can be aimed at knowledge 
sharing and coordination, research, development or demonstration, and even 
deployment.6 Such commitments can increase the technological effectiveness 
of an agreement over emissions reductions, although they are generally weak 
policies in terms of environmental effectiveness on their own. (Even at the 
international level, technology policies are complements to mitigation poli-
cies.) International agreements over technology standards can also be attrac-
tive from a competitiveness point of view, ensuring that trading partners have 
similar cost burdens. 
On the other hand, technologies might become a source of competitiveness. 
Due to different circumstances, some countries will enjoy a comparative ad-
vantage in certain technologies. In this case, not all countries will want to en-
gage in the same RD&D portfolio, but rather wish to specialize to some extent. 
For example, countries with large availability of geological sequestration sites 
may prefer to invest more in CCS innovation.
Global spillovers. Technology spillovers do not respect borders either, and they 
can inform priorities for dealing with global pollutants like GHGs. In particu-
lar, technological advances that support international agreements and efforts 
have additional value beyond what is appropriated at home. For example, 
some technologies may have better potential to be adopted among emerging 
economies that lack direct carbon regulation. Indeed, the availability of low-
cost abatement opportunities may help encourage these countries ultimately 
to take on hard emissions targets. Thus, developed countries will want to en-
5 See Fischer and Sterner (2007).
6 For a discussion of technology oriented agreements, see de Coninck et al. (2008).
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gage not only in technology transfer agreements, but also RD&D efforts that 
are likely to produce technologies to be transferred.7
5. Summary and options
We should recognize that not all barriers to adoption are market failures. 
Cost, reliability and quality issues, risk, etc., are all legitimate aspects that the 
market should be allowed to weigh in choosing cost-effective technologies. 
Furthermore, R&D market failures are not exclusive to energy technologies, 
and once most energy-related market failures are addressed (as through car-
bon pricing), then society must be wary of crowding out other legitimate in-
novation efforts.
As a result, the main tools for encouraging climate-friendly technologies 
should be those that encourage the market to make good choices more ge-
nerally: pricing carbon emissions and other environmental damages, remo-
ving distorting subsidies and barriers to competition, and supporting R&D 
broadly.
Some technologies face particular barriers, requiring society to take a decision 
of whether to support them, committing to major infrastructure investments 
or environmental risks. Other technologies may merit extra support, because 
they offer insurance against the possible need for deeper reductions, or becau-
se they have greater potential for being adopted in other parts of the world.
Several policy options are available to support technological development. 
Broad-based policies include R&D tax credits, funding universities and re-
search institutions, and other public support for research through competi-
tive grant processes. Scale economies can be supported through tax breaks, 
subsidies, performance standards (including tradable ones), or market-share 
mandates. While the latter two policies also create an implicit subsidy to the 
targeted technology (like renewable energy sources), paid for by the non-
preferred sources, they have the advantage of not only requiring no public 
outlays, but also naturally phasing itself out as the new technology becomes 
cost-competitive.
More specific policies are required to address particular market failures and 
barriers, including information requirements, energy efficiency standards, 
building codes, etc. In these cases, policies will generally be more effective, 
the more closely they target the specific market failure, as opposed to a spe-
cific technology. Standards perform better when they are flexible rather than 
prescriptive in terms of how the goal must be achieved.
7 See also Popp (2008) for insights into technology transfer policies.
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Finally, for those technologies identified as being particularly desirable, some 
narrower R&D policies are available. Traditionally, most policies subsidize 
inputs to research, either through specific tax credits, grants or contracts, or 
directed research in publicly funded laboratories. If government lacks the 
expertise or impartiality, allocation of these research funds can also be out-
sourced to independent third-party managers given specific mandates.8 Tech-
nology prizes, on the other hand, offer financial inducement to an output, 
such as being the first to develop a specific advance or the contestant having 
made the most progress by a deadline. Newell and Wilson (2005) indicate that 
such methods have been successful in the past and they could play a sup-
portive role in climate policy, although attention should be paid to the design 
features, including the technological target, the size and nature of the prize, 
and the method for selecting the winner. 
International engagement is another component of technology policy. Recog-
nizing that climate mitigation and technological advances are a global effort, 
countries can leverage their own R&D resources with international partner-
ships and agreements to encourage knowledge sharing and broaden the mar-
kets for new technologies.
Ultimately, the biggest driver of technological adoption and change will be 
the mitigation policy, which determines the demand for those technologies. 
An additional advantage of emissions pricing policies is their ability to gene-
rate revenue, which can fund help fund the complementary technology pro-
grams. However, that is not to say that all or even a particular share of those 
revenues needs to be explicitly earmarked for technology programs. Indeed, 
just as technologies should compete in the marketplace for adoption, tech-
nology policies should compete in the budget among all the worthy causes. 
Supporting climate-friendly RD&D is certainly one, but so are transitional as-
sistance, adaptation, tax relief, foreign aid, and a host of other demands unre-
lated to climate, including other innovations. Priority should be given to poli-
cies that enhance overall economic efficiency—broad R&D support, removing 
distortions, addressing regulatory barriers, reducing tax burdens, improving 
information, supporting fundamental research. Then policymakers can turn 
to more targeted programs, fully considering the benefits and the tradeoffs.
8 An example is the Ontario Centres of Excellence, which operate somewhat like a publicly 
funded venture capital firm.
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1.  Introduction
In December 2008 the European Parliament, Council and Commission passed 
a Renewables Directive that obliges Europe to increase the share of renewable 
energy from 6% to 20% of final energy by 2020. This is a visionary policy that 
creates an opportunity for Europe to move towards a long-term climate sta-
bilisation scenario. 
Figure 1 illustrates that the gap between business as usual emissions and the 
emission level that is compatible with stabilisation of carbon emissions at 
450ppm is increasing over time. While initial emission reductions might be 
viable with efficiency improvements and fuel shifting; the final emission tar-
get can only be achieved with continued economic growth in large shares of 
renewable energy (Stern 2006).
Figure 1. Stylised emission trajectory – business as usual versus stabilisation scenario
The Renewables Directive ensures that the European economy can move al-
ong the emission reduction trajectory while continuing the use of energy and 
economic success. The Directive supports investment in the future of Europe-
an economy and society, in a similar fashion to the previous public investment 
in schooling and Universities that enhanced European competitiveness and 
wellbeing. Governments can, however, fail to implement strategic decisions 
in the struggle to keep up with their day to day business. Three critical factors 
influence the successful implementation of the Renewables Directive:
First, large scale deployment of renewable energy sources requires changes to 
financial support schemes, network regulation, regional planning, permitting 
processes, and energy market design. If any one of the changes is not pursued 
effectively, then deployment will be halted in the respective country.
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Second, renewable energy sources are in competition with conventional and 
nuclear energy and can reduce the value of some coal and nuclear power sta-
tions. This can create incentives for some utilities to lobby against renewables 
or to obstruct their deployment. The typical strategy of such lobbyists is to 
request delayed action until the information base is improved, as successfully 
demonstrated by oil and power companies during the Bush administration.
Third, industry has ample experience with the volatility of government poli-
cies, as a result private companies hesitantly invest in production capacity for 
wind turbines when demand depends on future government decisions. Wit-
hout early private sector investment in the supply chain, however, the achie-
vement of the renewable targets will be expensive or difficult. 
This chapter discusses how quantitative policy indicators and targets for se-
lected aspects of the policy framework can 
• contribute to effective and comprehensive implementation of national po-
licy frameworks to facilitate sufficient deployment of renewables.
• enhance accountability of politicians, senior civil servants and private sec-
tor actors for future generations.
• increase the visibility of policy for the private sector to facilitate early in-
vestments in the supply chain.
By 30th of June 2009 the European Commission had to provide guidance for 
Member States on the reporting of their national renewable action plans. 
Quantitative policy indicators could form part of the template for this repor-
ting. Indicators can increase the visibility of future renewable markets – and 
thus facilitate private sector investment in the supply chain and projecting 
activities. Confidence in growing markets also encourages firms to invest in 
innovative activities and increase their exploration of cost reductions options, 
thus increasing the benefits of renewables policy (Aghion et al 1997; Neuhoff 
et al 2007). 
2.  How much guidance from governments?
Background
With the liberalisation of energy markets, governments shifted responsibility 
for purchasing, investment and operation decisions to the private sector. This 
was expected to deliver strong incentives for cost and price reductions, more 
economic technology choices and better project execution. 
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The theoretical model of liberalised energy markets envisages that govern-
ments limit themselves to setting the market design and a clear regulatory 
framework. Production and delivery of energy becomes the responsibility of 
private firms. 
In practice the public perceives energy provision as a public service and holds 
governments responsible for excessive prices or supply interruptions. This 
creates strong incentives for government to intervene in the market. The clear 
regulatory and market interface between government and energy companies 
sometimes becomes blurred. This is illustrated by the response of UK power 
companies to government pressure; ‘voluntary’ commitments are offered by 
power companies to support the fuel poor. 
In contrast to such implicit government interventions, renewable energy sup-
port schemes are explicit market interventions. Three types of market failures 
are cited as justification for the deviation from the technology-neutral energy 
market regulation. First, initial costs of early stage technologies are high and 
are decreasing with experience and learning about the technology (IEA 2000). 
Even companies that did not invest in the new technologies themselves, can 
benefit from these insights and produce the new technology at low costs. The 
initial investor does not capture these benefits for society, and reduces invest-
ment in the new technology below the socially optimal level without govern-
ment support. Second, incomplete cost internalisation of environmental and 
security of supply externalities for conventional technologies (Grubb et al 
2005; Roques e.a. 2006). Third, barriers set up by incumbent companies limit 
competition in new technology fields where they do not have incumbent ad-
vantages; disadvantages in scale, management expertise, and contractual ar-
rangements with the supply chain limit the number of entrants to renewable 
markets. 
These market failures have often been cited to justify renewable support sche-
mes that often aim to deliver 21% renewable electricity as required by the 
2001 Directive (Directive 2001/77/EC (2001). Is there a continued need for 
technology-specific support for much larger penetration levels, with many 
studies pointing to 30-40% of electricity to be produced from renewable sour-
ces by 2020? 
Need for continued support of renewable technologies?
For some technologies, such as on-shore wind, deployment has reached a 
scale at which learning externalities are declining and costs are becoming in-
creasingly competitive with conventional generation technologies. For other 
renewable technologies, the infant nature of the industries means they can 
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only achieve large scale deployment and learning benefits with technology 
specific support programs. (BERR 2008).
In theory, carbon pricing mechanisms and cap and trade systems will result 
in the internalisation of environmental externalities, for example the carbon 
price created by European Union Emission Trading scheme. Industry pres-
sure, however, has resulted in generous provisions for the use of cheap CDM 
credits instead of domestic mitigation efforts, subsequently causing a weak 
carbon price (Carbon Trust 2009 Forthcoming).. A low carbon price might re-
sult in continued investment in high-carbon energy infrastructures, which is 
incompatible with the long-term emission reduction targets and will result in 
such infrastructure being stranded as more stringent regulation is implemen-
ted. Renewable targets can shift the focus of industry investment and reduce 
the risk of such stranded investment for the competitiveness of European in-
dustry. 
The market structure of energy markets has not improved over recent years 
- and corporate strategies in the utility sector often remain reactive to regu-
latory policy, rather than pro-active in renewable energy technologies. As a 
result, concern remains whether new technologies will receive sufficient sup-
port from incumbent companies. Renewable support, designed in a way that 
is accessible for new-entrant companies, will therefore remain important. 
Thus the threat of entry – whether subsequent materialised or pre-empted by 
investment from the incumbents – is crucial to ensure that democratic decisi-
ons can be implemented even where they might not be shared by leaders of 
some incumbent companies.
These benefits of direct government intervention in technology choice need 
to be weighted against risks of negative impacts on incentives for decisive 
project execution, efficient operation, economic and innovative investment 
choices. In contrast to part technology projects that were directly managed 
by government, or executed by monopolistic utilities that could pass all cost 
to consumers, renewable projects are implemented in market environments. 
Feed-in-tariffs, tender auctions, or traded certificate schemes define the price 
or premium for renewable energy. As in any market environment, project de-
velopers retain profits from good negotiations with technology suppliers and 
engineering companies but also bear the risks of underperforming or delayed 
projects. 
Renewable energy targets, pursued with effective policies, retain the incen-
tives for efficient project execution and operation through the allocation of 
project risk to the project developer and operator. With a clear market inter-
face between private sector actors and the government, the risk of regulatory 
capture is limited as no public administrator is required to accompany indi-
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vidual energy projects over long periods of time. Thus the ‘cost’ of renewable 
energy targets in terms of reduced efficiency of liberalised energy markets is 
limited to the desired impact on the technology choice.
The European Parliament, Commission and Member State governments re-
presented in the European Council have passed a Renewables Directive that 
specifies clear renewable targets and compliance mechanisms. The next sec-
tion discusses whether the market requires further guidance from govern-
ments for technology choice, timing and regional distribution of renewable 
investments within their countries.
How specific to design the guidance for renewables?
Without guidance on technology choice, private sector actors would focus on 
least cost renewable energy technologies, currently on-shore wind, bio-mass 
and biog-gas from sewage and landfill. Cost of other renewable technologies, 
however, will decline with increased deployment and initial support. If such 
support is available, valuable options for the renewable portfolio can be de-
veloped. Without other renewable technology options it will be difficult to 
provide the overall volume of renewable energy required, and more costly 
to deliver energy at the time and location where it is required (Ragwitz et al 
2007). For example the DENA study pointed to the need of 800km additional 
transmission lines within Germany by 2015 (DENA 2005).
Without guidance on the timing of investments in specific technologies, it is 
difficult for the technology supply chain to invest in the necessary technolo-
gical improvements and production capacities. If the demand for a product is 
delayed by a few years, then the producer will lose the necessary trained staff, 
revenue and possibly go bankrupt. If the demand for a certain technology 
is unexpectedly high, then the necessary production capacity is missing and 
scarcity prices result. Instead of high deployment levels only high deploy-
ment costs will be observed.
This suggests governments should clearly define the timing and volume of 
investment in different renewable energy technologies using appropriate re-
gulatory frameworks. If, however, all European countries specify the exact 
investment quantities and time frames for specific technologies, then this puts 
the respective technology producers in a strong bargaining position. After all, 
the less responsive the demand is to the price of a producer, the higher the 
price charged in the market. 
Renewable support policies have to balance the demand for technology and 
time specificity, with the need for short-term flexibility in times of real or stra-
tegic scarcity prices for specific technologies. For price-based approaches, 
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such as feed-in tariffs, the mechanism to adjust tariffs for new projects over 
time has to be structured appropriately. For quantity-based approaches, such 
as tender auctions for off-shore wind farms, an appropriate schedule of late 
delivery payments for the project can give investors some temporal flexibi-
lity to negotiate with technology companies. In either case, it is important to 
assess the interactions across European support schemes to avoid expensive 
competition between countries.
Whether national governments also develop some indication for the regional 
distribution of renewable projects within their country depends on various 
factors. For wind power, grid expansion costs and system balancing costs can 
be reduced, if turbines are not only focused on high wind sites, but distri-
buted across the country. Also public acceptance might increase, if there is 
a clear perception of burden sharing by all citizens. Finally, with better un-
derstanding of the anticipated regional distribution of generation investment, 
grid expansion plans can be better tailored for the expected generation pat-
tern. Obviously, any such guidance needs to make an appropriate trade-off 
between regional diversification, regional power demand, grid expansion 
costs and regional resource availability. 
Initial renewable support schemes, for example in Germany during the 1990s, 
had regional specific components as they were often supported by cities or 
states. As renewable support schemes are now mainly at the national level, 
this specificity was lost. This was initially envisaged to encourage the deve-
lopment of the most suitable sites. Increasingly ambitious renewable targets, 
however, have shifted the objective from cherry picking the very best sites 
to large scales harvesting of renewable energy resources. Refocusing the ob-
jective towards local ownership might result in a renewed shift to define po-
licy with regional targets. After all, in other policy fields regional sharing, for 
example joint responsibility for schooling and training, is common practice 
and contributes to a sense of local ownership that increases public support.
A pragmatic approach
It is difficult to prescribe and commit to the exact technology mix or distri-
bution of investment within countries for 2020, however, it would also be 
difficult to deliver the renewable targets without any guidance. A pragmatic 
solution might be to offer more specific guidance during the initial project 
phases, which merge towards a broader objective further in the future. Thus 
longer-term targets can provide guidance if they (i) reflect a similar level of 
ambition to the current policy, (ii) seem viable given current technology ex-
pectations, and (iii) are in line with the environmental requirements of climate 
stabilisation.
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Figure 2 illustrates how countries can define specific targets for individual 
technology bands, for example for the time frame up to 2015, which are more 
broadly defined for later years. 
Figure 2. Possible evaluation of renewable contribution from different technologies (Source: 
based on Green X projections).
3.  What policy framework is required?
The current infrastructure, planning regime, regulatory and market design 
have evolved and been tailored for existing technology mixes and fuels. To 
facilitate renewable development and reduce costs of large scale deployment, 
this framework needs to be adjusted to match the requirements of renewable 
energy technologies (for a literature survey see Neuhoff and Sellers 2006). 
3.1  Planning
Planning regimes often require complex administrative procedures for energy 
projects. Large scale conventional power projects often have the technical ca-
pacity to overcome this issue, but planning constraints can imply a dispropor-
tionate burden for small scale projects. 
Determining an adaptable policy framework for planning often requires po-
licy reform: where planning constraints limit development, national govern-
ments should take action to reduce such barriers. The text box below outlines 
the policy reform instigated by the UK government to remove planning con-
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straints and incentivise affordable housing schemes through the use of policy 
indicators and targets. 
The challenge and policy response to planning constraints – example of 
UK housing sector
A lack of social and affordable housing due to planning constraints, 
amongst other factors, has lead to: ambitious building targets, increased 
investment, and planning system reform:
Challenge:
 • Difficulties of the number of institutions involved. Public sector: 
Housing Cooperation, National Housing Federation, Local Planning 
Authorities, English Partnerships, and housing associations. Private 
sector: Home Builders federation, planning consultants, and develo-
pers.
 • Local Planning Authorities and Regional Planning Bodies responsible 
for the preparation of local development documents and regional spa-
tial strategies
Approach:
 • National target: Three million new homes by 2020, two million of 
which by 2016. Spending Review 2004 target: Increase number of 
gross affordable homes to 70,000 by 2010/11.
 • Local Planning Authorities set regional targets; e.g: London target of 
50% affordable homes, new indicative target of 500,000 over next 3 
years. 
 • Implementation: Local Development Documents set out a housing 
implementation strategy describing management and delivery of 
housing and land targets and trajectories. 
 • Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990: enables of 
negotiation of planning agreements to facilitate development of affor-
dable housing and small-scale residential sites.
 • Reform of the land use planning system. New Planning Policy State-
ments for housing (PPS3), new Housing and Planning Delivery Grants 
for local councils.
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3.2  Infrastructure 
Transport, fuel, and electricity networks have evolved, often with public sup-
port, for the current power mix. Renewable energy is produced at different 
locations, and might also use different energy carriers (e.g. larger use of elec-
tricity). This will require adjustments to the respective networks. (Grubb et al 
2008).
3.3  Market design and regulation
Market design and regulation has been tailored for conventional generation 
technologies and fuel sources, in order to create appropriate incentives for ef-
fective use. The existing market design creates artificial constraints for large 
scale use of renewable energy technologies:
Figure 3 illustrates simulation results for hourly electricity prices – assuming 
the UK power system accommodates increasing shares of renewables (e.g. 
40% of electric energy from wind power by 2020). The 8760 hourly prices per 
year have been sorted increasing order. This shows that with increasing pe-
netration of wind power, the electricity price will drop to zero for increasing 
numbers of hours. This is, because with large shares of wind in the system, 
wind power production exceeds electricity demand and the value of marginal 
units of electricity is low or zero. In such hours some wind output might even 
be spilled. 
The lower prices during such hours also reduce the revenue of other power 
generation that is required to meet demand, e.g. at times of low wind out-
put. The simulation results illustrate that as a result power prices get higher 
during other periods of the year and thus create the incentive for investment 
in power generation that can meet demand at times of low output from inter-
mittent generation.
Success of policy reform?
S106 agreements have helped: in 2004/05 12% of total output of affordable 
housing was delivered by S106 affordable dwellings. However, completion 
of housing stock not rising as rapidly as the number of permissions granted 
for S106 agreements. This raises questions about the capacity of the plan-
ning system to deliver agreed levels of affordable housing.
Spending Review 2004 targets met: provisional figures from the Housing 
Corporation show that 29,419 (in 2007-08) were provided.
(Sources: Department for Communities and Local Government (2006 and 2007); London gov-
ernment website (2008); Meen and Andrew (2008); Monk et al (2006); Spending Review (2004).
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Figure 3. Simulated price-duration curve for one region of the UK with large scale wind power 
penetration (model description in Neuhoff et al 2008 ).
The model solution in Figure 3 depicts the results for one region of the coun-
try, not for the entire UK. For example, in the North of the UK, wind output 
might exceed demand and export capacity, resulting in spilling of the wind in 
this region even when overall demand in the UK could accommodate the sur-
plus. High penetrations of wind power may cause transmission constraints 
within countries to receive increasing attention. While adapting the network 
might require some increase of transmission capacity, an efficient solution to 
power system design will also include some congestion in the network. Buil-
ding a power line that is only operated for a few hours of the year is more 
expensive than spilling wind output from turbines in the North of the UK for 
a few hours per year.
Finally, with increasing penetration of wind power, the output changes from 
wind turbines require increased responses from both conventional power 
stations and demand-side to ensure supply matches demand at all times. As 
prediction accuracy for wind output only improves throughout the day, sig-
nificant adjustments in power station operation have to be pursued during 
the day. The current market design does not provide sufficient information 
exchange and liquidity to allow such adjustments during the day. 
This illustrates some of the aspects that future power market design will have 
to accommodate. Allowing for efficient use of the network and additional 
connection of power stations even in the presence of some congestion of the 
network, organising a flexible operation of the power system, and integrating 
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the demand side in providing balancing services, are key to adapting market 
design for new technologies.
3.4  Financial support schemes
The European Renewable Directive provides Member States with the flexibi-
lity to choose their national financial support scheme. Thus a long-standing 
discussion between feed-in tariffs, certificate schemes, and tender auctions 
did not have to be resolved at the European level before the Directive could 
be passed. (Mitchell et al 2006; Ragwitz et al 2006).While most of the argu-
ments for and against the different policy instruments are well known, the 
larger share of renewables currently required points to additional aspects to 
be considered.
The volume of investment that will be required to deploy the new renewables 
has been increased by the 20% target somewhere in the order of 400 billion 
Euro by 2020.1 Investment volume does not equate to cost for society because 
renewable energy technologies such as wind, tidal stream or solar replace fu-
ture fuel costs. But investment projects require finance. 
Figure 4 illustrates the finance structure of major European utilities as of No-
vember 2008. It shows that following high profits during recent years, utility 
companies have little debt. ENEL has the highest debt level, with debt cor-
responding to 50% of the equity level. This is perceived as substantial debt by 
the market; ENEL has to pay 2.5% more interest for bonds than other utility 
companies. Assuming all companies listed in Figure 4 would leverage their 
equity capital with 50% of debt, then they could raise additional 300 billion 
Euro funding. Obviously this is only a basic initial approximation, which ig-
nores the impact of higher leveraging on share prices, other investment needs, 
and also excludes some of the utilities.
This rough calculation shows the importance of considering the financial ac-
cess and investment risk for different renewable policies. The need for bond 
finance, new equity, or third party entry suggests that financing has to be sim-
ple and low risk. Otherwise it may prove impossible to deliver the renewable 
target. Tradable certificate schemes are unlikely to offer the necessary security 
– as the schemes combine regulatory risks about the evolution of the market 
design with market risks about the future scarcity level of renewables. Long-
term price guarantees, as possible with feed-in tariffs or tender approaches, 
1 Assuming 2/3 of additional renewables (e.g. 1100TWh) are delivered for simplicity of calcula-
tion with wind power at 30% load factor and 1000 Euro/KW investment cost, then total cost 
is 420 billion Euro. This is in line with more detailed results from the Green-X project (2004). 
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address these concerns and are more suitable to generate the necessary fi-
nance.
Figure 4. Finance structure of some major European Utilities.
3.5  Supply chain 
Delivering of the renewable targets also relies on an increase of the produc-
tion capacity for renewable energy technologies. For example, if an additional 
20% of European electricity is to be delivered from wind power then 240GW 
of new wind turbines will have to be installed. Figure 5 illustrates that such 
a deployment is consistent with historic developments of deployment levels, 
but does require a further doubling of the wind turbine production capacity 
devoted to the European market. 
 
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
ED
F 
GD
F S
ue
z 
E.
ON
 
RW
E 
Ib
er
dr
ola
En
de
sa
En
el
N
ati
on
al 
Gr
id
 
Un
io
n F
en
os
a
Ib
erd
ro
la
Re
no
v
ED
P 
Ga
s N
atu
ra
l S
DG
 
Ve
oli
a 
Sn
am
Re
te
Ga
s 
Su
ez
 E
nv
. 
Re
d 
El
ec
tri
ca
Ed
iso
n 
Te
rn
a
A2
A 
ED
P 
Re
no
va
ve
is
En
ag
as
Debt
Equity
Million Euro
32   
Climate change and Energy perspectives
Figure 5. Annual wind power deployment if 20% additional electricity is produced with wind 
power. A portfolio of several renewable technologies can reduce the required deployment.
Such a large increase of production capacity and production volumes would 
be very desirable in the current economic downturn. As the expertise for wind 
turbine production and the associated supply chain is in the private sector, 
the necessary investment would also be shouldered by the private sector. The 
main requirement for this investment is trust in the existence of the future 
market. Rapid implementation of the Renewables Directive at the Member 
State level will thus be a central element not only for the delivery of the 2020 
target, but also for a quick response by the private sector.
A recent study commissioned by the UK government analysed where bot-
tlenecks are likely to occur in the supply chain (SKM 2008). This is certainly 
a laudable exercise, but requires further methodological refinement to allow 
for meaningful insights. For example, the study concluded that a shortage of 
installation vessels will hamper the deployment of off-shore turbines around 
the year 2015. If such a shortage is anticipated, then one might expect private 
sector investors to fill the gap with new vessels. However, if the demand is 
not anticipated, or if the relevant private sector investors do not have confi-
dence in the demand projections, then bottlenecks can materialise. The end-
uring shortage of silicon wavers for PV cell production illustrates such an 
example; producers did not anticipate the continued high growth rates for PV 
cell production and as a result they did not provide the necessary production 
capacity. 
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4.  How to ensure the policy framework is in place?
Many aspects of a renewable framework have to be in place to allow for a 
successful deployment of renewables (Foxon et al 2003). This is illustrated in 
Figure 6; many policy levers have to be in the right position to allow for the 
flow of renewable projects. Any one of the levers can stop the flow through 
the renewable project pipeline. Should renewable project deployment not 
achieve the desired level then it may not be sufficient to identify one lever 
that is obstructing deployment, as one blockage might hide the existence of 
other barriers that only become apparent after the removal of the initial pro-
blem. This raises the question of how to design a policy framework to ensure 
all barriers for renewable deployment are sufficiently removed to allow the 
necessary flow of renewable projects.
Figure 6. Critical policy levers for the deployment of renewables.
The role of policy indicators
Policy indicators have received an increasing level of attention with regard to 
policy implementation (see recent review on policy cooperation: ISDCP avai-
lable at www.climatestrategies.org). Such indicators facilitate benchmarking, 
information exchange, and monitoring of effective implementation (Cust 
2009). The use of indicators has enabled targets to become an integral part 
of policy design. Amongst other examples, Lester and Neuhoff (2009) sum-
marise how policy targets have been used in the UK domestic context in the 
negotiation of Public Service Agreements between the local and central gover-
nment. Examples are also drawn from the Government Performance Results 
Act of the USA, which sets targets for central administration. Policy targets 
are also increasingly used in international processes, including in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers of the IMF, in the accession process of new Mem-
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ber States to the European Union, and as part of the Millennium Development 
Goals. Quantitative policy indicators were also successfully used to evaluate 
the implementation of the renewable electricity Directive 2001/77/EC (Eu-
ropean Commission 2005, Ragwitz et al 2006). Therefore quantitative perfor-
mance indicators have proven their value for monitoring the implementation 
of European renewable energy targets. They should now be further develo-
ped and extended to the heating and transport sector.
Figure 7. Time frames and outcomes used for policy targets.
The horizontal axis in Figure 7 shows that for the majority of cases, successful 
policy targets do not apply to the final outcome measure, such as the share of 
energy produced from renewables, but usually focus on intermediate indica-
tors. This is beneficial as it allows for shorter timeframes for target definition 
and implementation, which allows the time-lag from policy implementation 
to final outcome to be managed. Moving away from final outcomes, however, 
has the drawback of reducing the flexibility of policy choices; the closer po-
licy targets are linked to inputs, the more prescriptive they become for policy 
and low-carbon activity. The definition of policy indicators and metrics has to 
balance the benefits of short-time lags, which allow for effective implementa-
tion, and the flexibility provided by outcome-based metrics. 
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Quantitative policy indicators for effective management of renewable policy
The previous sections have highlighted the challenges for successful deploy-
ment of renewable projects; a set of quantitative policy indicators can help 
contribute to the delivery of the EU Renewables Directive. 
The projection of technological capacity, regional efficiency, and time-scales 
for renewable deployment should be the starting point for the design of such 
indicators. It is also critical that any metrics are compatible with the national 
renewable target. Policy indicators can then quantify what percentage of the 
estimated project investment is compatible with the evolving policy frame-
work. Figure 8 illustrates this approach; detailing the time-scales of the re-
moval of barriers needed to implement a successful renewables policy. For 
example, a country may currently face some constraints for renewables de-
ployment due to planning processes, but is pursuing a change to the neces-
sary administrative procedures. In this case, planning constraints prevent the 
full deployment volume, and careful attention is required for future process 
to ensure the necessary project volume will receive approval. Transparent and 
credible information of this kind can help private sector investors to antici-
pate future demand and market opportunities, and can focus government at-
tention to address remaining uncertainties. 
Figure 8. The role of forward looking, quantitative policy indicators. 
A set of quantitative policy indicators can therefore increase the visibility of 
policy for all actors involved in renewables deployment: producers can ob-
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serve that the level of future demand for their technology is supported by an 
effective policy framework.
First, project developers can trust the policy framework that is in place to cre-
ate demand for renewable projects. Second, policy makers and governments 
can verify whether they have implemented the appropriate policy framework, 
and can manage any subsequent changes required to ‘free up’ the project 
pipeline. Third, the public can observe whether their government has imple-
mented the necessary national policy framework and hold their government 
accountable to the commitments of heads of State, European Parliament, and 
European Commission to deliver 20% of European energy from renewables.
The quantitative policy indicators are only meaningful if they reflect a sha-
red understanding of the policy framework and its impacts on project invest-
ments. This shared understanding does not yet exist, because so far compre-
hensive quantification of the individual aspects of the policy framework are 
not yet common-place. 
Several methods, which require further development, can be envisaged to 
provide quantitative estimates for the different indicators. A survey among 
stakeholders offers one opportunity; this could provide an initial ‘estimate’ 
as a basis for further discussion with major stakeholders for renewable de-
ployment. Such a survey would reveal where stakeholders differ in their as-
sessment; outlining potential factual misperceptions or unforeseen policy im-
pacts.
5.  Conclusion
The European Renewables Directive requires Member States to deliver on 
average 20% of their final energy consumption by 2020 using renewable ener-
gy sources. To deliver this target, Member States have to adjust planning pro-
cedures, evaluate energy market design, provide grid and supply infrastruc-
ture, and implement support schemes that limit regulatory risk for finance. 
A failure to pursue any one of these changes risks the successful deployment 
of renewables. 
The chapter argues for the use of quantitative policy indicators to measure 
the success of current and future policies. Such indicators should allow for 
the assessment of different policies and regulatory changes required to pro-
vide a robust framework for renewables deployment. Increased transparency 
provided by policy indicators facilitates management of policy implemen-
tation, enhances accountability of governments, and can inform the repor-
ting of Member States to the European Commission. This allows technology 
companies to have confidence in projected deployment levels and can trigger 
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private sector investment in the supply chain to provide the necessary pro-
duction capacity.
The European Renewables Directive requires that the European Commission 
provides a guidance note to the Member States for their reporting in National 
Action Plans. This document might be a suitable location to specify quantita-
tive policy indicators, in order to create a harmonised European approach that 
facilitates cross-country comparison and learning.
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1.  Introduction
In January 2005, the European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS in the se-
quel) for carbon dioxide was launched. This system is the biggest tradable 
emission permit scheme in the world covering almost 11.000 installations, 
50% of all CO2 emissions and 40% of all greenhouse gas emissions originating 
in the EU. The ETS is a cap-and-trade system under which installations are 
initially assigned an absolute amount of emission permits, but these allowan-
ces can be traded freely. ETS is considered by the European Commission as 
an essential part of its climate action plan. It should help the EU to achieve 
its overall greenhouse gas reduction target of minus 8% by 2020 compared to 
1990 emission levels in a cost effective way, see EU Commission (2008a).
The EU ETS should be clearly distinguished from the flexible mechanisms 
(emissions trading ET, joint implementation JI and clean development mecha-
nism CDM)2 included in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Firstly, the European system 
deals with trading between firms and installations, while the Kyoto flexible 
mechanisms allow trading of greenhouse gas emission permits between coun-
tries. Secondly, the EU ETS scheme is limited to emissions of carbon dioxide 
only whereas the Kyoto system covers six greenhouse gases. Thirdly, the EU 
ETS started already in 2005, thus predating the start of the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto protocol (2008-2012). Although they are markedly diffe-
rent in setup, a formal link exists between both systems as certified emission 
reductions (CERs in the Kyoto jargon) can be used by European firms to cover 
their positions in the EU ETS. However, access to these CERs in the EU ETS 
system is limited deliberately to avoid that the EU market would be flooded 
by cheap CERs, see EU Commission (2008a).
The overall aim of this chapter is to investigate how EU ETS allowances were 
allocated to individual installations in Belgium and its main regions Flanders, 
Wallonia and Brussels-Capital region.3 We will compare allocations and ve-
rified, i.e. actual, emissions4 for Phase 1 (2005-2007) and for the first year of 
Phase 2 (2008). We are especially interested in observing the underlying dis-
tribution of activities and economic sectors responsible for CO2 emissions in 
Belgium and covered by the EU ETS directive. 
2 For a definition of these instruments, see the item ‘Kyoto Protocol’ at: http://unfccc.int/.
3 Flanders refers to the northern part of Belgium and counts approximately 6 million inhabit-
ants. Wallonia is situated in the south of Belgium and has 3.4 million inhabitants. The Brussels-
Capital Region consists of the city of Brussels and its surrounding municipalities which count 
about one million inhabitants.
4 It should be noted that certified emissions will closely match actual emissions because of strict 
compliance provisions: accurate monitoring, substantial penalties and low probability of 
measuring errors.
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Contrary to many previous studies, for instance by Ellerman and Buchner 
(2006) and Kettner et al. (2007), we are able to link the emissions data with 
company accounting data. This allows us to investigate the relation between 
a company’s allocation gap (i.e. difference between allowances and verified 
emissions) and its business characteristics such as turnover, value added and 
profit margins. A similar analysis was made for Belgium for the years 2005 
and 2006 but using aggregated data on sector level instead of individual com-
pany data, see De Bruyckere and Voorspools (2007). Our analysis is also re-
lated to the empirical work by Anger et al. (2008). Whereas the latter focus 
in particular on lobbying to explain the allocation of EU ETS allowances to 
German firms, our analysis is mainly descriptive. 
Most studies hereto were limited in scope to the first trading years 2005 and 
2006 of Phase 1. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) and Kettner et al. (2007) com-
ment on the amount of over-allocation and likely abatement efforts that have 
taken place in 2005 and 2006. We however, will investigate the complete first 
phase (2005-2007) of the EU ETS in Belgium. This allows us to look at the over-
all picture for the first phase including the issue of ‘banking’.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide some back-
ground information on the design of the national allocation plan in Belgium. 
Next, in section 3, the emissions and allocations for Belgium and its regions 
are discussed in general terms. Installation data concerning the first phase of 
the EU ETS are discussed in section 4. First we compare the allocations and 
emissions in the different regions. Next, installation data are analyzed based 
on CITL activity codes and finally, company level data are composed in order 
to include economic performance indicators. Section 5 concludes.
2.  Background on the Belgian National Allocation Plan
Under the EU emissions trading directive 2003/87/EC (EU Commission 
2003), each member state had to submit to the EU Commission so-called Na-
tional Allocation Plans (NAPs) in which it specifies allocations of CO2 allo-
wances for all installations covered by the directive on its territory. The EU 
Commission had to approve this NAP before actual allocations of permits 
to installations could start. Two waves of NAP drafting and revision were 
organized, one for Phase 1 (2005-2007) and one for Phase 2 (2008-2012). The 
EU Commission’s main criterion for evaluating the draft NAPs was whether 
they were consistent with a pathway to meet the member state’s Kyoto target. 
Different from most other member states, the Belgian NAP actually consists 
of three regional plans. The integration of these three plans into a national 
plan reflects the fact that Belgium is a federal state with three different regions 
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(Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital region) and that the bulk of environ-
mental policy competences have been assigned to the regional authorities. In 
Belgium, about 310 installations are covered by the EU ETS: 170 in Flanders, 
130 in Wallonia, 10 in Brussels Capital Region and 2 under the federal regime, 
see Belgian NAP (2004) and (2006). Compared to other EU member states, 
this number of installations falls between the minimum of 19 (Luxemburg) 
and the maximum of over 1800 (Germany). For the first phase of the EU ETS 
(2005-2007), Belgium’s allowances amount to approximately 2.5% of the total 
number of EU ETS allowances. This is comparable to Finland (approx. 2%) 
and Greece (approx. 3%), see EU Commission (2008a). 
The Belgian national allocation plan5 (NAP) allocates on average 62.1 Mt CO2 
annually to installations covered by the scheme over the 2005-2007 period. 
Emission trading under the EU ETS in Belgium covers approximately 48% 
of its total national greenhouse gas emissions. In general, this percentage is 
between 30 and 50% in other member states.
The regional allocation plans in Belgium base the number of industrial al-
lowances on historical emissions, on efficiency factors agreed upon in sector 
agreements (Wallonia) or benchmarking agreements (Flanders), and assump-
tions about future growth. Moreover, all allowances were allocated using 
grandfathering (i.e. freely distributed) to incumbent installations in all three 
regions in Belgium; no allowances were auctioned.6
During Phase 1 of EU ETS, the allocated allowances are distributed in equal 
portions in 2005, 2006 and 2007 and they become invalid on 2008, May 1. Thus 
the validity and use of the emission rights is associated with the trading pe-
riod for which they are granted. This means that borrowing (i.e. using future 
allowances to cover current emissions) and banking (i.e. keeping current al-
lowances to cover future emissions) were allowed within the trading period. 
However, banking or borrowing of allowances between phase 1 (2005-2007) 
and phase 2 (2008-2012) was not allowed. 
3.  Analyzing the EU ETS data for Belgium
Data for the emissions and allocations (and some basic installation characte-
ristics) were downloaded from the so-called Community Independent Trans-
action Log CITL database, containing information for each individual instal-
5 Sources: www.iea.org and national allocation plan (www.klimaat.be).
6 Rights allocated to installations that go out of business during the trading period are added to 
the reserve. This reserve is used in order to allocate rights to new firms. The reference year(s) 
used in the NAP 2005-2007 to forecast energy use and emissions was 2000-2001 and for the 
NAP 2008-2012 is 2005.
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lation under the EU ETS.7 We adopt the following terminology when talking 
about allocations. When the number of allowances allocated to an installation 
(denoted Ai,t) exceeds the number of verified emissions (denoted Ei,t) in a par-
ticular period, this installation is said to be ‘long’. Installations in the opposite 
situation, i.e. when actual emissions exceed allocated allowances, are said to 
be ‘short’. As is shown in every textbook on environmental economics (see for 
instance Kolstad, 2000, or Proost and Rousseau, 2007), profit maximizing firms 
should reduce their emissions up to the point where marginal emission abate-
ment costs are exactly equal to the market price of a permit. If the resulting net 
emissions fall short of the allocated amount of allowances (i.e. when the firm 
is short, see left hand panel of Figure 1), they should fulfil their obligations by 
buying additional permits. This is cheaper than reducing their emissions be-
low Ei,t. Every additional ton of emission reduction would be more expensive 
than the market price of an emission permit. In the other case, when net emis-
sions exceed the allocated amount of allowances (i.e. when the firm is long, 
see right hand panel of Figure 1), it is profitable for firms to push emissions 
down below Ai,t. This frees up emission permits that can be sold in the market 
at a price higher than the marginal emission abatement cost. Hence, whether 
companies are short or long, they should always reduce emissions until the 
marginal cost of the last ton of CO2 abated equals the market price of allo-
wances. This is illustrated in the graph below (Figure 1). Emissions without 
reduction efforts (so-called business-as-usual emissions) are denoted by E°. 
Firms that are short can save costs (area c) buying permits instead of reducing 
in house. Firms that are long can make money (area b) on reducing their emis-
sions more than required by the initial allowance allocation. 
Figure 1: short and long allocation
7 See: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/citl_en.htm. Starting from the raw 
data we kept only those observations for which emissions and allocation data were available 
for all three years of Phase 1. Due to this data cleaning, the numbers presented in this chapter 
can differ slightly from the numbers in official publications. 
emissions
(ton CO2)
MAC
(€ / ton CO2)
p
b
a
Ai,t Ei,t E°
SHORT 
Ai,t < Ei,t
c
 
emissions
(ton CO2)
MAC
(€ / ton CO2)
p
Ai,tEi,t E°
LONG 
Ei,t < Ai,t
b
a
 
 
46   
Climate change and Energy perspectives
Note that the data we have available only include information on verified 
emissions, that is Ei,t , and permit allowances, that is Ai,t. No information is 
available on business-as-usual emissions E° and hence, it is a priori impossi-
ble to estimate the emission abatement effort (i.e. Ri,t = E° – Ei,t), that companies 
have undertaken under the EU ETS. Estimating abatement efforts requires 
additional information sources and assumptions. See Delarue et al. (2008) for 
an example for the power sector under EU ETS, and Ellerman and Buchner 
(2008) for a discussion on how much abatement EU ETS would have delive-
red in its first two years 2005 and 2006.
In general, we will use to the more neutral wording ‘long’ or ‘short’ as defined 
higher, rather than the more normative terminology ‘over’ and ‘under’allo-
cated. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) point out that a long (short) position is 
not necessarily evidence of strong (weak) emission abatement efforts. A long 
(short) position can be explained as well by the a priori uncertainty concerning 
economic activity and by stochastic disturbances (like weather conditions) 
that were not foreseeable when allocation plans are approved. Hence, long 
and short positions should never be interpreted as indications of emission 
abatement effort, or the lack of it.
We start by taking a look in Figure 2 at the evolution through time of emissi-
ons and allocation for Belgium and its regions. All three years of Phase 1 plus 
2008 data were included.
Figure 2: Evolution of emissions and allocations for Belgium and its regions
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The left hand panel of Figure 2 shows the evolution of aggregate emissions 
and allocations for Belgium as a whole and for its regions. The solid lines 
stand for the number of allocated permits, the dotted line for the verified 
emissions. We aggregated data for the small number of installations under 
the authority of the Brussels Capital region and Federal government into one 
category “other”. This category’s share in overall Belgian emissions is mar-
ginal (0.1% share in aggregated 2005-2007 emissions) compared to the other 
regions (60.7% for Flanders and 39.2% for Wallonia). The resulting lines for 
this category can therefore hardly be distinguished from the x-axis. Walloon 
industry had a long position in every of the four years considered. Flemish 
installations were allocated short in 2005 and 2008, but long in 2006 and 2007. 
Overall, Belgian installations were substantially long in all three years of 
Phase 1 (2005-2007), but were almost even in the year 2008 (Phase 2). The 
number of allocated emissions is decreasing while moving from Phase 1 to 
Phase 2 whereas emissions follow the opposite trend, especially in Flanders. 
This emissions trend reversal is not a structural phenomenon but it is proba-
bly caused by slight changes in definitions of variables8 and in the composi-
tion of the dataset. The right axis of the left hand panel in Figure 2 refers to a 
composite index of industrial production output (physical quantities) for the 
Belgian economy as a whole. Remarkably, the emissions trend is the reverse 
of the trend in industrial production. During Phase 1, production grew conti-
nuously whereas emissions went down slightly. Moving to Phase 2, emissions 
went up whereas industrial production declined substantially. There are no 
indications in the emissions data of the economic slowdown that started in 
the last months of 2008. The reason emissions do not follow production could 
be that during the initial period of the world economy’s slowdown, produc-
tion firms did not cut production but accumulated stocks. In addition, the 
slight redefinition of emissions (broader scope) is responsible partly for the 
rise in verified emissions. However, the effects of the sharp decrease in econo-
mic production due to the worldwide economic crisis will surely be reflected 
in 2009 emission data.
The right hand panel of Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the aggregated emis-
sions over allocation ratios for the different regions and Belgium. If this ratio 
is less (more) than 100%, installations have on aggregate more (less) allowan-
ces than verified emissions, and hence they are long (short). Most regions are 
in most years long. The Brussels region follows a very different path from 
Flanders and Wallonia in Phase 1 but, as said before, its share in total Belgian 
8 For instance, in Phase 2, starting in 2008; emissions of nitrous oxide from the production of 
nitric acid are also included in the EU ETS. Some chemical installations therefore show an 
substantial increase in both allocation and emissions between Phase 1 and 2 whereas this only 
reflects changes in emission accounting rules, see EU Commission (2008a).
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emissions is negligible. For the first year of Phase 3, the Brussels’ emission to 
allocation ratio converges to the Belgian average. All regions’ emissions to 
allocation ratios increase strongly and converge while entering Phase 2 of EU 
ETS.4. Analyzing installation data for Belgium and its regions
First, we look at differences in allocations and emissions at regional level. 
Next, we analyze data at installation level for different activities and finally, 
we compose company level data in order to include economic performance 
indicators.
4.1  Analysis at regional level
In Table 1, we first consider aggregate allocations and emission levels for the 
first phase of EU ETS, i.e. the period 2005-2007. Overall, Belgian installations 
were allocated 59.56 million tons of CO2 per year whereas they only emitted 
54.31 million tons of CO2. Hence, the allocation for Belgium as a whole was 
long by about 5.25 million tons which represents 8.8% of the total number of 
permits allocated. The analysis performed by Ellerman and Buchner (2008) 
and Kettner et al. (2007) allows us to compare Belgium with other EU mem-
ber states for the period 2005-2006. Only 6 out of 24 member state had a short 
position. For Belgium, the balance of the gross long and short positions for its 
installations result in a small overall net long position, which situates Belgium 
mid-way. Looking at the long/short positions by member states, Belgium can 
be categorized with the countries that are long on balance but by relatively 
modest amounts such as The Netherlands, Germany, Slovenia and Portugal. 
As mentioned by Ellerman and Buchner (2008) these modest long positions 
fall well with what might be expected as a result of a relative advantage in 
abatement or less favourable economic, meteorological or other circumstan-
ces. Moreover, Belgium seems to show a trend to increasing energy efficiency. 
There is thus no evidence of over-allocation by Belgium and its regions. 
Table 1: Emissions, allocations, emissions over allocation ratio 2005-2008
Flanders Wallonia other Belgium
E A E/A E A E/A E A E/A E A E/A
2005 33.58 31.68 106.0 21.70 26.54 81.8 0.07 0.10 75.8 55.36 58.31 94.9
2006 32.98 34.24 96.3 21.72 25.61 84.8 0.07 0.10 68.5 54.76 59.95 91.3
2007 32.25 34.71 92.9 20.48 25.61 79.9 0.05 0.10 50.2 52.78 60.42 87.5
32.95 33.55 98.2 21.299 25.92 82.2 0.06 0.10 64.8 54.31 59.56 91.2
2008 34.22 32.31 105.9 20.12 22.11 91.0 0.33 0.34 98.1 54.67 54.75 99.8
own calculations based on CILT data
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Over the entire Phase 1 (2005-2008), the Flemish region allocated allowances 
for 100.65 MtCO2 to Flemish industry. This amounts to 34.72 MtCO2 per year. 
The New Entrant Reserve (NER) was set at 0.5 MtCO2 per year. The NER 
contains allowances that are set aside to cover emissions from firms that enter 
in the market. According to the Walloon allocation plan, the average yearly al-
location between 2005 and 2007 is 25.92 MtCO2 and the New Entrant Reserve 
amounts to 0.5 Mt CO2. Brussels has allocated its installations 0.30 MtCO2 over 
the 2005-2007 period, or an average of 0.10 MtCO2 per year, and established 
a New Entrant Reserve of 0.009 MtCO2 per year. The federal allocation plan 
deals with nuclear installations only and allocates these installations 0.00033 
Mt CO2eq per year (i.e. 0.001 Mt CO2eq over the period 2005-2007).
Regionally, there is some marked difference. Allocations exceed emissions in 
all years in Wallonia and Brussels / Federal. A similar pattern can be observed 
for Flanders in 2006 and 2007 and for the whole of the first Phase, but its al-
location fell short of emissions by 6.0% in 2005 and 7.4% in 2008 (see Table 1). 
Comparing Phase 1 to the first year of Phase 2, we observe that in all regions, 
the emission to allocation ratio increases, hence allocations are becoming tigh-
ter. In Flanders emissions exceed allocations substantially; in the other regions 
we observe the reverse pattern. Overall, Belgian emissions slightly exceed al-
locations in 2008 (see Table 1).
Positive net aggregate allocations (i.e. Nr = ∑ier Ai – Ei ≥ 0) in a region do not ne-
cessarily imply that all individual installations in that region are over-alloca-
ted. Therefore, we show in Figure 3, the so-called aggregate long (i.e. Lr = ∑ier 
max {Ai – Ei,0}) and aggregate short (i.e. Sr = ∑ier min {Ai – Ei,0}) positions for 
Phase 1. The grey bars denote total short allocations, the black bars stand 
for total long allocations for a region9. Net allocations are denoted by white 
bars. Flanders allocated -13.0% short and +14.6% long compared to -1.4% and 
+19.4% in Wallonia. Hence, Flemish environmental authorities were both 
stricter (i.e. allocated more installation short) and less lenient (i.e. allocated 
less installations long) than their Walloon counterparts. 
9 What we call aggregate long or short position is labeled “gross” long or short by Ellerman and 
Buchner (2008), i.e. the sum of all long (short) positions of individual installations in a sector, 
region or country. They also speak of “net” long or short positions being the sum of gross long 
and short positions. We, in contrast, only speak of “net” position of a sector, region or country 
and the sign indicates whether it concerns a long (+) or short (-) position.
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Figure 3: Average short, long and net allocations by region for Phase 1 (2005-2007
In Figure 4 we present a similar graph for the year 2008, the first year of 
Phase 2 (2008-2012) of EU ETS. The most important difference between both 
phases for Belgium is that in 2008, the Belgian economy as a whole was allo-
cated short by some 1.6%. This short allocation stems from the fact that Flan-
ders has allocated its industrial installation short in 2008 compared to long on 
average during Phase 1. 
Figure 4: Average short, long and net allocations by region for Phase 2 (2008)
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4.2  Analysis at installation level
We return now to the analysis of Phase 1. Both regions are very different in 
economic activity. We therefore present in Figure 5 a split of the regional emis-
sions over different activities. The activity categories are taken from the CITL 
activity codes and in addition, we split the CITL Power and Heat sector into 
its basic components.10 It is important to note that the regional split of emis-
sions is based on the location of the emission source, not on the location of the 
final consumption of the output produced. For instance, some of the power 
produced in Flanders is used in Wallonia because the Belgian electricity grid 
is highly interconnected between the regions. Likewise, some cement produ-
ced in Wallonia is consumed in Flanders as well. Finally, it note that the CITL 
activity “heat” (i.e. heating boilers with a thermal capacity exceeding 20MW) 
covers a very wide range of economic production sectors like chemical plants, 
food industry, textile industry etc. 
Figure 5: Average emissions by region and activity for Phase 1 (2005-2007)
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Emissions per activity in million tons of CO2. Own calculations based on CILT data.
10 This split was done on the basis of an inventory of all power stations in Belgium.
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Figure 5 reveals important differences in activities between the regions in Bel-
gium. Flemish emissions are dominated by power producers (15 mio tons) 
followed by heating boilers, refineries and steel mills (each about 5 mio tons). 
Cement production dominates Walloon emissions (about 8 mio tons) follo-
wed by power producers, steel mills and heating boilers (each about 4 mio 
tons). Some sectors are exclusively located in one region: refineries are only 
found in Flanders, cement producers only in Wallonia. The sectors of glass, 
ceramics (bricks), paper and pulp are small compared to the main sources of 
CO2 emissions.
In relative terms, see Figure 6, the power sector accounts for about one third 
of Belgian emissions, heating boilers, cement and lime production and steel 
mills for little more than 15% each and refineries for about 10%. In Flanders, 
power production accounts for 45% of regional emissions; in Wallonia ce-
ment, lime and chalk for somewhat less than 40%.
Figure 6: Emission shares by activity
Emission shares by activity in percentage of regional total emissions. Own calculations based on 
CILT data.
We now turn to short and long emissions by activity. Figure 7 shows that in 
most sectors and regions, all installations have been treated in the same way, 
i.e. mostly they have been allocated long. Only in the power sector in Flan-
ders, we observe substantial short allocations. 
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Figure 7: Average short, long and net emissions by region and activity for Phase 1 (2005-2007)
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Short (grey bars), long (black bars) and net (white bars) allocations in million tons of CO2. Own 
calculations based on CILT data. Mind different scale for region “other”.
According to the Belgian National Allocation Plan 2004 (Belgian NAP, 2004), 
the procedures to allocate emission allowances to power and heat installati-
ons are quite similar in the Flemish and the Walloon region. In both regions 
allocations are based on installation specific technology and CO2 efficiency 
criteria. Typically, allowances are allocated with reference to a best availa-
ble technology or average efficiency benchmark for the sector. For instance, 
for fossil fuel power stations, both regions use a combined-cycle gas turbine 
technology as the benchmark technology. Other technologies like for instance 
conventional thermal plants using coal, are assigned an amount of allowances 
using the CO2 emission factor of the CCGT benchmark technology. Moreover, 
the regions explicitly aim at stimulating renewable energy production, fuel 
switching and the use of blast furnace gasses. For this reason, installations 
with combined heat and power as well as installations using blast furnace 
gasses receive a sufficient number of allowances to cover their forecasted 
emissions.
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Figure 8: Relative short and long positions by region and activity for Phase 1 (2005-2007)
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Short (grey bars), long (black bars) and net (white bars) allocations in percentage relative to total 
number of allowances allocated. Own calculations based on CILT data. Mind different scale for 
region “other”.
In relative terms, see Figure 8, the most important long positions were found 
in the Brussels region and for installations that resort under Federal autho-
rity (see ‘other’ and mind the change in scale compared to the other graphs). 
However, given the small number and very low level of emissions of these 
installations, they hardly affect the overall picture for Belgium. In Flanders, 
heating boilers, refineries, steel mills and ceramics plants are long by about 
15% and the paper industry by about 20%. The power sector is short by about 
18%. The picture in Wallonia is similar, but somewhat more pronounced, for 
all sectors except power. Glass producers in both regions have been allocated 
almost exactly the amount of permits they need to cover their emissions. Only 
the power sector is really different since it is allocated long by almost 15% in 
Wallonia versus short by almost 18% in Flanders. 
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Zooming in on the power sector
Looking at the allocation procedure for the power and heat installations11, we 
find that typically the amount of allowances allocated is equal to the forecas-
ted emissions from heat or energy production (FEi) multiplied by a bench-
mark emission correction factor (ci):
     Ai = ciFEi
The correction factor ci represents the relative position of the production 
technology used in installation i compared to the benchmark technology. For 
power generation, all installations using CCGT, combined heat and cokes or 
blast furnace gasses were assigned a correction factor equal to one. Conventi-
onal power plants (like coal fired installations) were facing a correction factor 
significantly higher than one. The use of this benchmarking technique implies 
that, if there is heterogeneity of technologies used in the power sector, this 
should result in some installations being allocated their verified emissions 
(the CCGT installations), and some others being allocated short (the less ef-
ficient installations like coal powered plants for instance). We now check in 
the data whether final allocations of allowances reflect this logic of the NAP. 
In Figure 9, we therefore zoom in on the power sector and distinguish between 
different technologies. For STAG power plants, emissions over allocation ra-
tios are very close to unity meaning that they are allocated almost exactly the 
amount of permits they need to cover their emissions. Conventional plants, 
using for instance coal, are under-allocated in Flanders but over-allocated in 
Wallonia. Power plants burning flue gasses from blast furnaces or cokes ovens 
are slightly under-allocated in Flanders and slightly over-allocated in Wallo-
nia. Here some important caveats are to be made. First, most of these plants 
use a mix of fuels (also gas, coal and biomass) and therefore their net position 
also depends on the precise fuel mix. Secondly, for the Walloon region, no 
information is available on the exact amount of permits that were transmitted 
for free by the steel companies to the power generators upon delivery of their 
flue gasses. We made an ad hoc correction but probably this correction assigns 
too many allowances to the power generators.12 Peak units are strongly under-
allocated in Flanders, over-allocated in Wallonia and strongly over-allocated 
11 The federal government (not the regions) are responsible for the nuclear plants in Belgium 
(Doel and Tihange). These nuclear power plants emit a minor amount of CO2 during periodic 
testing. In order to guarantee safety at those plants a sufficient amount of rights are allocated 
to cover these limited emissions.
12 A correction was made to account for flue gases from blast furnaces and cokes production that 
are used in power plants. According to the Belgian NAP, emission allowanes for these gases 
are allocated to the steel companies, but are to be transferred for free to the power companies 
upon delivery of the gases. For Flanders, exact corrections could be made based on detailed 
data disclosed publicly by the Flemish environmental administration. For Wallonia, these data 
are not publicly available.
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in Brussels. It is important to know that the total volumes of emissions for 
this type of technology are very small. Combined heat power installations are 
slightly over-allocated in Flanders. In Wallonia they were given an amount of 
allowances matching very closely their verified emissions. 
Figure 9: Emission over allocation ratios for power sector by technology
Own calculations based on CILT data.
It seems to us that the logic of the national allocation plans is reflected quite 
well in the data for Flemish installations but less so in Wallonia. This regional 
difference could point to a more fundamental problem in the allocation pro-
cess. Not the benchmarking factors are the problem but rather the inaccurate 
emission forecasts. For many companies, production volumes were estimated 
by extrapolating past growth paths into the future. This procedure proved too 
optimistic in many cases. This observation points to the extreme importance 
of getting the emission forecasts right, if the ETS is to have the desired effect 
on emission levels. Note that the present – unpredicted - decrease in industrial 
production will therefore lead to a likely long position for most industrial sec-
tors in 2009. Thus, we can conclude that the presence of both short and long 
positions in the Flemish and Walloon power sector as well as in the Flemish 
heat sector reflect installation specific differences and inaccurate emission fo-
recasts rather than real procedural differences. 
4.3  Analysis at company level
The link between EU ETS installations and companies is not one-to-one. A 
substantial number of companies in the database own more than one instal-
lation and sometimes these installations are situated in both regions. Since 
we want to relate emissions and allocations of companies to their economic 
performance in this section, we have to aggregate the installation data at the 
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company level. The distinction between the regions becomes irrelevant in 
that case. For that purpose, we traced the corresponding company owning it 
for every installation.13 Based on their unique VAT number, we retrieved ba-
sic economic performance indicators from the BELFIRST company accounts 
database, BELFIRST (2009). The indicators used in this chapter are: staff (i.e. 
number of employees in full time equivalent units), turnover, value added 
and after tax profits (EBT, i.e. earnings before taxes). We computed the three 
year averages for the first phase of EU ETS 2005-2007. The BELFIRST database 
classifies every company’s main economic activity according to the 4-digit 
NACE-BEL2008 sector classification of the Belgian Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs.14 Based on these NACE-BEL2008 codes, we aggregated compa-
nies into 14 main economic sectors. In Table 2, we report basic indicators, ag-
gregated on that sector level. The advantage of this sector classification over 
the installation codes used before is that we are able to disentangle the CILT 
sector ‘heat’ into several subsectors like food & beverages, textile, refinery, 
chemical, nonferrous and equipment sector.
13 This was possible using installation identifier codes used in the Belgian National Registry of 
EU ETS installations. Sometimes, finding the matching firm proved difficult because some 
companies have split up their activities into different independent business units and it is not 
always clear to what business unit a particular installation is linked. However, we were able to 
link the vast majority of installations and for the remainder of the analysis we ignore observa-
tions for which the link could not be made with certainty.
14 See http://www.belgostat.be for the sector classification details.
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Table 2: Accounting data by sector
staff turnover value added profits profit 
margin
FTE % million € % million € % million € % %
extraction 1,048 0.7 403 0.4 164 0.8 7 0.1 1.8
food & beverages 14,709 9.8 7,863 7.8 1,907 8.8 880 11.6 11.2
textile 71,56 4.8 1,224 1.2 349 1.6 -16 -0.2 -1.3
wood, pulp & paper 4,259 2.8 2,008 2.0 643 3.0 132 1.7 6.6
refinery 4,172 2.8 23,672 23.4 1,655 7.6 2,371 31.3 10.0
chemical 32,385 21.5 18,874 18.6 7,167 33.0 1,676 22.1 8.9
glass 5,312 3.5 1,338 1.3 501 2.3 54 0.7 4.0
bricks & building 
materials
3,197 2.1 799 0.8 288 1.3 49 0.6 6.1
cement 1,529 1.0 667 0.7 304 1.4 111 1.5 16.6
steel 15,878 10.5 9,069 9.0 2,076 9.5 618 8.2 6.8
nonferrous 9,087 6.0 6,848 6.8 898 4.1 241 3.2 3.5
engineering & 
equipment
37,823 25.1 14,761 14.6 3,245 14.9 416 5.5 2.8
power 9,037 6.0 12,779 12.6 2,073 9.5 977 12.9 7.6
other 4,987 3.3 928 0.9 478 2.2 65 0.9 7.0
TOTAL 150,581 100.0 101,231 100.0 21,748 100.0 7,579 100.0 7.5
Own calculations based on BELFIRST and CILT data.
We observe that over half of the workforce in the sectors included in the 
Belgian EU ETS is employed in the equipment, chemical and steel sectors. 
Next, in terms of sales revenues the largest sectors involved in the EU ETS 
are the refinery and chemical sectors followed by the equipment and power 
sector. However, in terms of value added the chemical sector is by far the 
most important contributor to the total Belgian value added (i.e. GDP), with 
the equipment sector as a second. The extraction sector has the lowest contri-
bution to GDP. When we look at industry profits, the perilous position of the 
textile sector is striking. Finally, we calculated profit margins as total profits 
divided by sales revenues. High profit margins prevail in cement, food & be-
verages and refineries (>10%) industries; low profits (<3%) in extraction and 
equipment (including car assembly) sectors. 
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Table 3: Emission data by economic sector
emissions allocation
emissions 
over 
allocation
short 
emissions
long 
emissions
net 
emissions
Mt CO2 Mt CO2 % Mt CO2 Mt CO2 Mt CO2
extraction 3,155,821 3,676,392 85.8% -2,575 539,839 520,571
food & beverages 2,049,577 2,271,192 90.2% -106,304 321,711 221,615
textile 86,090 117,593 73.2% -68 33,022 31,503
wood, pulp & paper 743,869 976,972 76.1% -18,580 242,006 233,103
refinery 4,151,012 4,989,420 83.2% -60,255 925,235 838,408
chemical 3,113,237 3,798,485 82.0% -17,955 707,216 685,248
glass 1,351,314 1,400,729 96.5% -72,556 131,670 49,415
bricks & building 
materials
641,378 704,670 91.0% -43,306 108,115 63,291
cement 5,016,599 5,515,607 91.0% -34,063 526,313 499,008
steel 11,362,493 15,146,586 75.0% -118,151 3,910,325 3,784,093
nonferrous 226,734 251,578 90.1% -5,688 30,333 24,844
engineering & equip-
ment
233,515 315,559 74.0% -2,294 84,387 82,044
power 19,671,462 17,377,730 113.2% -5,105,726 2,621,817 -2,293,733
other 2,570,084 2,963,246 86.7% -25,150 416,957 393,162
TOTAL 54,373,185 59,505,759 91.4% -5,612,671 10,598,946 5,132,572
Own calculations based on BELFIRST and CILT data.
As was already indicated higher, Table 3 shows that only the power sector 
was allocated fewer allowances than its verified emissions, resulting in a ne-
gative gap for this sector. Even though all sectors include both firms with 
short positions and firms with long positions, the distribution of these short 
and long firms seems to vary over sectors. As a case in point, the extraction 
(limestone industry), textile, chemical and equipment sectors have few firms 
with short positions (‘short’ less than 3% of ‘long’). 
As mentioned by Kettner et al. (2007), the sectoral differences in the genero-
sity of allocations can be motivated by the ability to pass on additional costs 
due to market power and/or low price elasticity of demand, the industry’s 
abatement costs, the share of CO2 costs in total production costs and by the 
international competitiveness position of sector. The net impact of these dif-
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ferent elements on a sector’s allocation can thus be difficult to explain. In or-
der to understand better underlying characteristics, we computed in Table 4 
different ratios relating companies’ emissions to their economic performance.
Table 4: ETS impact by sector
emissions 
over turnover 
g CO2 per €
ETS impact 
over turnover 
%
ETS impact 
over profit 
%
ETS Phase 3 
impact over 
turnover 
%
extraction 7832 1,29 72,10 -31.33
food & beverages 261 0,03 0,25 -1.04
textile 70 0,03 1,91 -0.28
wood, pulp & paper 370 0,12 1,77 -1.48
refinery 175 0,04 0,35 -0.70
chemical 165 0,04 0,41 -0.66
glass 1010 0,04 0,92 -4.04
bricks & building materials 803 0,08 1,29 -3.21
cement 7526 0,75 4,50 -30.10
steel 1253 0,42 6,12 -5.01
nonferrous 33 0 0,10 -0.13
engineering & equipment 16 0,01 0,20 -0.06
power 1539 -0,18 -2,35 -6.16
other 2771 0,42 6,08 -11.08
TOTAL 537 0,05 0,68 -2.15
Own calculations based on BELFIRST and CILT data.
The first column of Table 4 reports the ratio of emissions over turnover, i.e. 
an indicator of intensity of the different sectors measured in gram CO2 per 
€ turnover. The highest emission intensity can be found in the extraction (li-
mestone industry), cement, power and steel sectors. 
The next column reports an imputed cost of CO2 emissions trading for the first 
phase of EU ETS. This CO2 cost is defined as the net long/short position times 
average permit price over the trade period (taken here to be 10 €/ton CO2) di-
vided by turnover. This cost measures only the direct trading costs (i.e. selling 
and buying of permits) and does not include effects on abatement costs. Thus 
a positive CO2 cost implies positive rents to the sector since its firms could 
have sold excess allowances on the market. A negative amount, on the other 
hand, implies a monetary cost for the sector since it needs to buy additional 
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permits to cover its verified emissions. Admittedly, this CO2 cost measure is 
crude because (1) spot market prices of EU ETS allowances were very volatile 
during Phase 1 (see, among others, Alberola et al. 2008), and (2) the fact that 
companies holding surpluses by the end of the first phase probably did not 
bother selling them as the price on the spot market was almost zero. Hence, 
the exact cost of fulfilling its obligations under EU ETS might be higher or 
lower depending on the exact timing of permit exchange operations. Still, our 
crude measure reveals that for most sectors the impact of the trading costs 
associated with EU ETS is very small: on average only 0.05% of turnover, and 
less than 1% for almost all sectors. Only for the extraction sector this measure 
exceeds 1% of their turnover. Also, we find that only the power sector had to 
bear a financial cost which turned out to be limited: -0.18% of its turnover. It 
should be noted here that turnover includes the CO2 costs that are transferred 
to the consumer via output price increases. Thus it is a net effect, including 
partial compensation of ETS related costs. Compared to profit levels, the im-
pact is on average more pronounced: 0.68% of profits. For the extraction sec-
tor, the impact amounts to more than 70% of their profits.
Finally, we also computed a ‘worst case’ impact of CO2 regulation. The ‘ETS 
Phase 3 impact over turnover’ takes into account full auctioning of allowan-
ces and is calculated as the sector’s total emissions times average estimated 
permit price (i.e. 40€/ton CO2 according to the impact study, see: EU Com-
mission, 2008b). Looking at the ratio of this hypothetical CO2-cost over reve-
nues per sector indicates that the impact of changing from grandfathering 
to auctioning of permits would be huge on the trading costs incurred by the 
extraction and cement sectors (about 30% of sales revenues) and still sizable 
for steel, bricks and building materials and power sectors (between 5% and 
10%). However, it is important to note that these costs would not necessarily 
be borne by the companies themselves since part of the trading costs will li-
kely be transferred to the consumers. The extent to which costs can be passed 
on by increasing product prices will essentially depend on the price elasticity 
of demand which is very different for the sectors and firms in the database.
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Table 5: Spread measures by sector
Number  
of companies
normalized 
standard 
deviation
 allocations
Herfindahl 
index  
allocations
Herfindahl 
index 
emissions
extraction 4 36 2987 2972
food & beverages 33 345 917 986
textile 11 87 1281 1438
wood, pulp & paper 10 86 1530 1832
refinery 7 226 6469 6258
chemical 38 108 674 656
glass 10 123 3128 3644
bricks & building materials 15 138 1384 1520
cement 3 156 3549 3406
steel 8 44 2958 3191
nonferrous 7 82 2675 2716
engineering & equipment 20 70 1088 1003
power 4 213 6467 7339
other 34 153 4124 4848
TOTAL 204 153 2146 2331
Own calculations based on CILT data.
As illustrated before, the allocation gaps (i.e. difference between allocated al-
lowances and verified emissions) can be quite different for firms in one sector. 
In order to measure the dispersion of these allocation gaps, we computed for 
each economic sector the standard deviation of the allocation gaps normali-
zed by the mean allocation level of the corresponding firms. For Belgium as 
a whole, we observe a dispersion measure of 153%. As shown in Table 5, this 
dispersion indicator varies substantially over sectors. The extraction sector 
shows the lowest dispersion with only 36%, in contrast to the food and bever-
age sector with 345%. Also, the refinery and the power sector show a signi-
ficantly higher dispersion than average. This dispersion is most likely linked 
to, (1) the number of firms in a particular sector, and (2) the heterogeneity of 
production processes used.
The variability of the allocation gaps within a sector might be explained in 
several ways. Firstly, it might relate to technical characteristics and reflect the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of production techniques used in the sector. 
For instance, the low dispersion within the extraction and steel sectors reflect 
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the homogeneous nature of the production processes used. For the food & 
beverages and power sector, the opposite holds. The high dispersion measure 
in the power sector is surely an indication of the underlying heterogeneity 
of the energy production processes. As we mentioned before, allowances in 
the energy sector were allocated by using the combined-cycle gas turbine as 
benchmark technology. Thus differences in the allocation gaps closely mirror 
differences in power generation technologies. 
Secondly, the observed variability of the allocation gaps might be explained 
by lobbying activities by firms or interest groups. Anger et al. (2008) test for 
this hypothesis on a similar dataset of German companies. As a measure of 
lobbying, they use the number of employees in sectoral lobbying organi-
zations. This type of data is, however, not readily available for Belgium. In 
this chapter, we therefore use an indirect measure of lobbying potential, i.e. 
the concentration of emission shares. The idea is that highly concentrated 
industries would be able to coordinate their lobbying activities more easily 
than highly dispersed sectors. The last columns in Table 5 report Herfindahl-
Hirshmann indices (HHI) of concentration of allocation and emissions shares. 
The HHI for a particular sector equals the sum over all firms of their squared 
emission shares. If all emissions would be concentrated in only one company, 
HHI would equal 10.000 (100 times 100). As can be seen, concentration is par-
ticularly high in the power sector and refineries. The picture is the same for 
the HHI calculated using emissions or allocation numbers. In spite of its high 
concentration, the power sector was the only ‘short’ sector in Belgium. And 
some moderately concentrated sectors received relatively generous allocati-
ons. Hence, at first sight there seems to be no systematic relationship between 
industry concentration and emission over allocation ratios. This is of course 
no proof of absence of lobbying in the regional allocation process. Further 
analysis, using more accurate measures of lobbying activity by sectors, is re-
quired to answer this question.
5.  Conclusions and suggestions for further research
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the allocation to installations of al-
lowances for the first phase (2005-2007) of the EU ETS in Belgium. Interesting 
about Belgium is that its National Allocation Plan is the sum of three different 
regional allocation plans because environmental policy has to a large extent 
been regionalized. The data shows that overall Belgian installations have been 
allocated long, i.e. have been given more allowances than what they need to 
cover their verified emissions, during all years of Phase 1. Taken together over 
all years of Phase 1, the gap between allocations and emissions amounts to al-
most 9% for Belgium. In Flanders, the allocation was short in 2005 but long by 
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about 2% in total for the three years of Phase 1. Walloon industry was long by 
8%, Brussels installations even by 33% (but their share in total Belgian emis-
sions is less than 1%). When moving to Phase 2, a trend reversal seems to have 
happened. For the first year of the second phase (2008), the number of allo-
wances is almost equal to verified emissions and emission to allocation ratios 
increase strongly for all regions. For Phase 2, Flemish allocations were short 
by 6%, Walloon allocations long by 9%, and Brussels’ allocations long by 2%.
Looking at different activities, we see that in particular the power sector in 
Flanders was allocated short. This is in line with the allocation formulas in the 
regional allocation plans that use emission intensity of a combined cycle gas 
turbine plant as a benchmark to allocate allowances. For the Walloon region, 
we find, surprisingly, that conventional power plants (using for instance coal) 
have been allocated more generously than the benchmark. This is probably 
due to substantial overestimation of the production volume forecasts that en-
ter the allocation formula.
A major innovation of this chapter over previous studies is that we were able 
to link individual installations to the companies owning them and hence, also 
to economic performance indicators. The analysis shows that for most sectors, 
the impact of EU ETS on their profitability has been very limited, and mostly 
non negative, during Phase 1. Only the extraction sector (lime production) 
might have generated substantial revenues from selling surplus allowances. 
Smaller revenues are likely in the steel and cement industry. However, much 
depends on the timing of their allowance sales decision. If they banked sur-
plus allowances, they were not able to make profits because by the end of 
Phase 1, the EU allowance price collapsed. We also did a hypothetical exercise 
in which we assumed that companies had to buy permits at the price of 40€/
ton CO2 for each ton of their verified emissions. This corresponds to the aucti-
oning mechanism proposed for Phase 3 (2012-2020) of EU-ETS. This analysis 
reveals potentially important impacts for extraction and cement industry up 
to 30% of their turnover if they would not be able to recover part of the CO2 
cost via an increase of their output prices.
Overall, it seems that the EU ETS is unlikely to have a significant effect on 
the Belgian installations’ abatement efforts. A notable exception is the power 
production sector where fuel switching as a result of changes in relative pri-
ces of fuels, has probably lead to significant emission abatement as argued by 
Delarue et al. (2008). This is hardly surprising given the CO2 allowance price 
collapse in 2006 and the relatively short time that elapsed since the introduc-
tion of EU ETS. However, the presence of the emission trading system has 
lead to an increased awareness of the climate problem, both at industry level 
and individual citizen level. The real impact of the EU ETS depends largely 
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on expectations concerning the future auctioning of allowances, the expected 
overall tightening of climate policies, future permit prices and forecasts of 
economic activity. 
Further research into the underlying factors influencing the allocation of CO2 
allowances in Belgium would be useful as well as a comparison to other coun-
tries. In particular the political economy of the distribution of allowances to 
sectors and individual companies remains an interesting research topic.
66   
Climate change and Energy perspectives
References
Belgian NAP (2004), Belgian National Allocation Plan (Federal Public Service 
of Public Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment, Brussels). 
Belgian NAP (2006), Belgian National Allocation Plan for CO2 Emission Al-
lowances 2008-2012 (Federal Public Service of Public Health, Food Chain 
Safety and Environment, Brussels).
Alberola, E., Chevallier, J., Chèze, B. (2008), Price drivers and structural breaks 
in European carbon prices 2005–2007, Energy Policy 36, 787-797
Anger, N., Böhringer, C., & Oberndorfer, U. (2008). Public interest vs. interest 
groups: allowance allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. ZEW, 
discussion paper no. 08-023.
BELFIRST (2009), Belgian company accounts database, http://www.belfirst.
bvdep.com 
Betz, R., & Sato, M. (2006). Emissions trading: lessons learnt from the 1st phase 
of the EU ETS and prospects for the 2nd phase. Climate Policy 6, 351-359.
De Bruyckere, V., and K. Voorspools (2007), Winners and losers of the EU ETS, 
results from 2005 and 2006, Special Report Fortis Energy & Environmental 
Markets (Fortis Mechant Banking, Brussels).
Delarue, E., K. Voorspools, and W. D’haeseleer (2008), Fuel switching in the 
electricity sector under the EU ETS: review and prospective, Journal of 
Energy Engineering - ASCE 134(2), 40-46.
Ellerman, A.D. and B.K. Buchner (2008). Over-allocation or abatement? A pre-
liminary analysis of the EU emissions trading scheme based on the 2005-06 
emissions data, Environmental and Resource Economics, 41(2), 267-287.
Ellerman A. D. and B. K. Buchner (2007). The European Union Emissions Tra-
ding Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results. Review of Environ-
mental Economics and Policy 1: 66-87.
EU Commission (2003), Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for green-
house gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amen-
ding the Council Directive 96/61-EC (European Commission, Brussels).
EU Commissions (2008a), EU action against climate change – the EU emissions 
trading system - 2008 edition (European Commission, Brussels)
EU Commissions (2008b), Impact Assessment for the Proposal for a Direc-
tive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
   67
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the EU greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading system (European Commission, Brussels)
Kettner, C., A. Köppl, S.P. Schleicher and G. Thenius (2007). Stringency and 
distribution in the EU emissions trading scheme – The 2005 evidence. 
FEEM working paper 22.2007.
Kolstad, C. (2000). Environmental economics. Oxford University Press.
Markussen, P., and Svendsen, G. T. (2005). Industry lobbying and the political 
economy of GHG trade in the European Union. Energy Policy 33, 245-255.
Proost, S., and Rousseau, S. (2007). Inleiding tot de milieueconomie. Acco 
Leuven.
Rogge, K., Schleich, J., and Betz, R. (2006). An early assessment of national al-
location plans for phase 2 of EU emission trading. ISI, UNSW and CEEM, 
working paper sustainability and innovation no. S1/2006, Karlsruhe and 
Sydney.

Is There a Future for Nuclear Energy? 
Johan Eyckmans and Guido Pepermans 
HUBrussel & K.U.Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën
70   
Climate change and Energy perspectives
1.  Introduction
This contribution discusses the role of nuclear power in the future energy 
system. During the last decade, a number of – mainly European – countries 
took the political decision to phase-out nuclear power for the production of 
electricity, but many of them are considering to revise this decision. This con-
tribution discusses whether, from an economic perspective, it would be wise 
to ban the use of nuclear power for electricity production. We review the tra-
ditional arguments for government intervention in the electricity market in 
general and apply them to nuclear technology.
We believe that a review of the arguments is necessary because the current de-
bate is strongly polarized between opponents and advocates of nuclear ener-
gy. We therefore hope that our review can contribute to an open and informed 
public debate. Readers looking for a clear yes or no answer will probably be 
disappointed with this contribution. At several instances, we will sketch ad-
vantages and disadvantages of particular policy options, but often it is impos-
sible to make robust recommendations because, among others, adequate data 
are missing or because normative arguments are involved for which science 
cannot give clear cut guidance.
Issues of market power in the electricity market, external costs of power ge-
neration technologies and security of supply will be the main focus of our 
review. All of these argument call for some form of government intervention 
because unregulated markets would yield undesirable outcomes from a so-
cietal point of view. But the main question is how, and to what degree, public 
authorities should intervene in electricity markets? 
We will show that tradeoffs need to be made. Basically, low consumer prices 
of electricity, ambitious future greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and 
a complete ban on the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation are in-
compatible. If a nuclear phase-out is the policy choice of the government, then 
it should accept the consequences in terms of an increased cost of the energy 
system. Nuclear capacity will have to be replaced by other, likely more expen-
sive technologies with their own externality problems, which will increase the 
cost of the energy system and thus also electricity prices.
We will also argue that technology bans are seldom wise from an economic 
perspective. Economists believe that technology choices should be left to pri-
vate investors who have an important informational advantage over public 
authorities. Policy makers should limit themselves to creating a framework in 
which all necessary conditions are fulfilled to take well informed and socially 
optimal decisions. However, relying on decentralized decisions of private in-
vestors is desirable only if their incentives and societal objectives are aligned. 
   71
This requires getting the prices right for the use of all technologies, taking into 
account all relevant external costs by means of, for instance, emission taxes 
or tradable permits, or contributions to decommissioning and nuclear waste 
management funds.
The contribution is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of 
nuclear generation capacity and production. The aim is to put the contributi-
on of nuclear energy to the World’s energy provision in perspective. Section 3 
discusses the role of governments and policy makers in the technology choice 
process. To streamline the discussion, we first discuss whether, and if yes how, 
direct government intervention in generation technology choices should look 
like. In section 4, we apply these insights to nuclear power and discuss the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the nuclear technology. We will focus mainly 
on externalities and security of supply arguments. Section 5 argues that low 
electricity prices are incompatible with an energy system in which nuclear 
energy is phased-out and emissions of greenhouse gases are strictly capped. 
This latter point is illustrated with some simulation exercises for Belgium and 
for the World as a whole. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2.  The rise and fall and rise of nuclear energy?
Research on radioactive materials and nuclear fission technology started in 
the 1930ies with pioneering work by scientists like Fermi, Bohr and Hahn.1 
The research was boosted in the late 1930ies and early 1940ies by the quest for 
nuclear weapons during the Second World War. After the war, research into 
more peaceful applications of nuclear energy lead to the construction in the 
US and Russia of the first nuclear reactors that were able to produce electricity. 
The first commercial nuclear power plant was the UK reactor of Calder Hall in 
Sellafield which opened in 1956 and had an installed generation capacity of 50 
MWe2 (later expanded to 200MWe). Since then, many countries followed and 
by now, some 436 reactors are operational worldwide, see Table 1.
According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, total operational nuclear genera-
tion capacity amounted to 372 GWe in January 2009 of which 78,4% was in-
stalled in OECD countries and 21,6% in non-OECD countries (see Table 1). 
The United States, France, Japan, the Russian Federation and Germany are 
the most important countries in terms of installed nuclear generation capacity. 
These five countries account for about 253.6 GWe, which is 68% of worldwide 
capacity. 
1 See U.S. Department of Energy (2000) for a history of nuclear energy.
2 MWe: Megawatt of electricity, GWe: Gigawatt of Electricity.
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However, in terms of capacity under construction and planned capacity the 
leading role of OECD is much less pronounced. In non-OECD countries, 77 
new reactors are under construction versus 33 in OECD countries. The distri-
bution is even more skewed if we look at planned reactors: 63 in the OECD 
countries versus 206 in non-OECD countries.
In terms of the share of electricity production covered by reactors, France 
(77%), Lithuania (64.4%), Slovakia (54%), Belgium (54%) and Ukraine (48%) 
are in the top 5. In 2008, 16 countries relied on nuclear power for more than 
25% of their electricity production (NEA (2008)). On a worldwide scale, nu-
clear plants provide about 16% of electricity production. In OECD-countries, 
about 23% of electricity is produced with nuclear plants. Of total primary 
energy consumption (which includes, besides electricity, fuels for heating, 
transport, …), the share of nuclear energy is about 5% according to BP (2009).
The weighted average age of the operational nuclear plants is slightly above 
25 years, with the oldest plants being 42 years old. Figure 1 shows that the 
growth of installed nuclear capacity has slowed down over the past 15 to 20 
years, in the aftermath of the nuclear accidents of Three Mile Island (1979) 
and Chernobyl (1986) and the collapse of fossil fuel prices in the mid eigh-
ties. Over the past 15 years, between 2 and 6 reactors per years were added, 
whereas in earlier years the annual increase was higher. Confronting these 
numbers with the data in Table 1, and assuming an average construction lag 
of about 60 months, suggests that this slowdown is coming to an end as 43 
nuclear plants are currently under construction. In the medium to long run, 
we see in Table 1 that a further 110 reactors with a total capacity of 121 GW are 
planned and that 267 nuclear reactors have been proposed of which 32 in Eu-
rope. Overall, these data suggest that nuclear power is experiencing a revival 
compared to the past 15 to 20 years. 
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Table 1: Worldwide nuclear installations and capacity in 2009
Nuclear 
Electricity 
Generation 
(2007)
Reactors 
Operable
Reactors 
Under Con-
struction
Reactors  
Planned1
Reactors 
Proposed2
Uranium 
Required 
2009
TWh No. GWe No. GWe No. GWe No. GWe tonnes
OECD 2,187.9 341 309.2 13 13.2 33 42.7 63 89.6 54,626.0
OECD America 904.8 124 114.8 2 1.5 15 18.3 28 34.6 20,779.0
OECD Europe 879.5 144 130.4 4 4.1 2 2.4 32 51.0 22,015.0
OECD Pacific 403.6 73 64.0 7 7.6 16 22.0 3 4.0 11,832.0
Non-OECD 420.3 95 62.7 30 24.5 77 78.4 204 174.3 10,879.0
Total 2,608.1 436 371.9 43 37.7 110 121.1 267 263.9 65,505.0
1 Planned: firm decision
2 Proposed: under consideration.
Source: NEA (2008)
Focusing on Europe however, we observe in Table 1 that four reactors are un-
der construction, while only two new reactors are planned. In the recent past, 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden have announced to 
reduce their dependence on nuclear power, via a gradual phase-out policy. In 
Germany, the shutdown date for the last reactor is 2022. In Sweden, the last 
nuclear plant would close in 2025, in the Netherlands in 2033. In short, Europe 
does not appear to follow the trend sketched above. However, recently some 
countries (Belgium, Sweden and Germany) are reconsidering their phase-out 
decision while others are planning (Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Uni-
ted Kingdom) or considering (Italy, Poland, United Kingdom) to build new 
reactors.
Figure 1: Age structure of nuclear plants
Source: NEA (2008).
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To be complete, it should be noted that some reactors have already been closed 
in the past. The first reactor was closed in 1968 and over the past decades, a 
total of 128 nuclear plants have been taken out of service with a total capacity 
of about 40 MWe. Most of them were test reactors that had been build for sci-
entific research purposes.
In Belgium, seven reactors were build between 1974 and 1985, see Table 2. 
The oldest three of these reactors date back to 1974 and 1975 meaning that 
their 40 year operating license is due to expire in 2014 and 2015. They repre-
sent about 1,800 MWe or 31% of total installed capacity in Belgium. Recently, 
the Belgian government has proposed to extend the lifetime of these installa-
tions to 2025. As of today (June 2010), a final decision has not been approved 
by the Belgian Parliament.
Table 2: Nuclear reactors in Belgium
Installed capacity 
(MWe)
Starting year of 
operations
Year of 
decommissioning 
(40 years lifetime)
Proposed 
Extension  
of lifetime
Doel 1 392.5 1974 2014 2025
Doel 2 433.0 1975 2015 2025
Doel 3 1,006.0 1982 2022
Doel 4 1,008.0 1985 2025
Tihange 1 962.0 1975 2015 2025
Tihange 2 1,008.0 1982 2022
Tihange 3 1,015.0 1985 2025
Total 5,825.5
Source: Devogelaer and Gusbin (2009).
3.  Why should the government intervene in the electricity 
sector?
In this section we focus on the question whether policy makers should actu-
ally impose on the electricity generation sector what technology (not) to use. 
We think good reasons exist to leave technology choices – i.e. whether or not 
to use nuclear – to the private sector. However, this is not the same as arguing 
that a government has no role to play in steering the technology choices made 
by electricity generation firms, as economic textbooks tell that government 
intervention can enhance social welfare when market failures exist.
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3.1  Market power
With respect to the electricity sector, several types of market failures can be 
identified. The first one is market power, which refers to situations where 
firms have an advantage over other producers due to economies of scale or 
scope, the availability of information, access to specific resources or technolo-
gies, or because they are protected by law. Under conditions of market power, 
profit maximizing firms will typically restrict their output in order to raise 
the price for their product and to generate more profits for themselves. This 
reduces social welfare compared to the social optimum because some consu-
mers with marginal willingness to pay higher than the marginal production 
cost will not be served. Moreover, the high price leads to a transfer of surplus 
from consumers to the producer. In this situation, welfare can be improved 
by means of appropriate public regulation in order to make the firms with 
market power behave more in line with efficient and socially desirable market 
outcomes. 
Theoretically, the high investment costs in nuclear or conventional power 
plants constitute a barrier to entry for potential newcomers that want to chal-
lenge the incumbent power producers. Moreover, demand for electricity is ty-
pically very price insensitive such that price increases do not lead to a strong 
decline in demand. And in spite of deregulation, the wholesale electricity 
markets in many geographical areas remain highly concentrated. Hence, ne-
cessary conditions for potential abuse of market power are satisfied. In prac-
tice, it is very hard to prove the abuse of market power by dominant firms in 
a market. But, after an extensive investigation, a report commissioned by DG 
Competition of the European Commission concludes: “Ultimately, our analysis 
supports the two key points of the sector inquiry report; namely, that the current mar-
ket structure in the EU electricity markets (the six markets studied) in a significant 
number of hours is likely to be conducive to anticompetitive behaviour. And secondly, 
that price outcomes on the EU wholesale electricity markets may have been less keen, 
than they otherwise would have been, had the markets been structured more competi-
tively.” (London Economics (2007), page 6)
The response to this problem of market power has changed over time. Initi-
ally and up to the 1980ies, public authorities relied mostly on direct regulation 
of electricity sales prices to limit producer’s market power. Typically, prices 
were capped by the government and where determined by a so-called cost-
plus rule that allowed power companies to cover their production and invest-
ment costs plus a “fair” return. However, during the last decades, a shift in 
policy was made towards promoting competition at the production and dis-
tribution side by means of market deregulation. In many countries, electricity 
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retail, transport and power production activities were separated by splitting 
up the vertically integrated monopolies into independent business units.
Taxing rents of written off nuclear power stations?
In several countries, among others in Belgium, strong voices are heard 
pleading for taxing the profits of power producers who own old, econo-
mically written off, nuclear power stations. It is correct that these power 
stations are very profitable and contribute in a very substantive way to the 
profits of power producers. We illustrate this argument in Figure 2. In the 
so-called short-run merit curve, i.e. the ordered list of electricity generation 
technologies which constitutes the marginal cost curve of electricity pro-
duction, nuclear energy is typically characterized by low marginal costs 
(height of bars) and high capacity (width of bars). In a market equilibrium 
(with or without market power), the sales price of electricity is determined 
by the marginal technology, i.e. the last and most expensive generation 
technology that has to be called upon to cover demand at a given time. This 
marginal technology is very often a gas fired power plant which is more 
flexible than base-load technologies like nuclear or coal fired plants. Given 
the typical merit curve, electricity companies owning low marginal cost 
plants like nuclear or wind turbines, enjoy high profit margins on these 
plants. For completeness, it should be added that since we are looking in 
Figure 2 at marginal costs, fixed investment and capital costs are not co-
vered yet. Rents, i.e. the area between the price and the merit curve, should 
be sufficient to cover fixed capital costs. The average or unit cost curve in 
Figure 2 does take into account these fixed costs and is therefore best suited 
to illustrate the economic profits. The shaded area, average profit margin 
(i.e. price minus average costs) times production volume, depicts profits in 
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Short-run merit curve and electricity market outcome
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Although many issues remain to be solved and evidence is mixed whether 
this change in regulation has promoted social welfare, see for instance Joskow 
(2008), it shows that governments are actively intervening in an attempt to 
limit market power of electricity producers. Would a ban on the use of nuclear 
power solve the problem of market power in the production of electricity? 
The answer is clearly no. Also other power generating technologies like con-
ventional coal fired power plants or off shore wind farms face high upfront 
capital costs acting as barriers to entry for newcomers. We believe that the 
issue of market power in electricity generation is very important in terms of 
social welfare, but that it should be tackled with appropriate regulation stra-
tegies. Which form this regulation should take is beyond the scope of this con-
tribution but we are convinced that a simple ban on the use of one particular 
technology will not solve the problem of market power in the power sector.
3.2  Environmental externalities
A second market failure, and in the case of electricity markets one of the most 
important ones, is the presence of environmental externalities. Externalities 
refer to situations where decisions taken by one agent have an uncompensa-
ted positive or negative impact on the well-being or production possibilities 
of other agents. Examples of negative external effects in the electricity sector 
are the environmental damage caused by burning fossil fuels for electricity 
generation or the nuclear waste and catastrophic accident risk associated with 
the use of nuclear reactors. Damage is caused to those living in the immediate 
or wider neighbourhood (acid rain, particulate matter…), but also to present 
and future generations (CO2-emissions, nuclear waste…). Without govern-
Governments can very well think that this constitutes an unfair sharing of 
the welfare surpluses in the electricity market and therefore rents should 
be redistributed. A lump-sum profit tax is in that respect probably the best 
instrument to recapture rents from the private sector since it does not dis-
tort marginal production decisions. However, we also believe that one 
should take this argument further than only for nuclear energy. The same 
arguments can be used for other technologies, like conventional coal fired 
plants or off shore wind farms and, ultimately, all capital intensive installa-
tions in other industries like for instance cement kilns, steel mills, crackers 
in refineries and so on. Hence, we believe governments can resort to taxing 
rents of installations that are economically written off but we see no reason 
to apply the argument to nuclear energy only. Such a profit tax is illustrated 
in Figure 2 as well. It simply carves out part of the shaded economic profit 
area.
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ment intervention these external costs are not reflected in market prices resul-
ting in too much use of technologies bearing negative externalities. Referring 
back to Figure 2, the full cost to society of producing electricity should include 
both the private production costs (reflected by the merit curve) and the margi-
nal external costs. From the point of view of society, the relevant marginal cost 
curve for the supply of electricity is situated above the merit curve (see Figure 
3). The welfare maximizing production (price) level of electricity is therefore 
lower (higher) than the level chosen by a perfectly competitive profit maxi-
mizing power company. In section 5, we will pursue this point and review 
the available estimates of external costs associated with different electricity 
generation technologies. 
A public good is an extreme case of the presence of externalities. It is a good 
for which the benefit derived by one consumer does not reduce the benefit 
to anyone else and no consumer can be excluded from enjoying these bene-
fits. Standard economic theory tells us that unregulated markets are unable to 
provide socially desirable levels of public goods because of free riding beha-
viour by its beneficiaries. In the context of energy markets, security of supply 
is a public good. Security of supply can broadly be defined as the adequate, 
affordable and reliable supply of energy (IEA (2007)). Markets will by them-
selves not correctly reflect the costs and benefits of security of supply because 
it is beyond the power of an individual producer or consumer to guarantee 
security of supply. Again, there is a role for governments to take care of an 
appropriate level of security of supply as this will benefit all consumers and 
producers. Governments have at least partially tackled the security of sup-
ply issue by developing policies with respect to adequate investments in the 
energy system, the efficient use of energy (mitigating demand growth), fuel 
mix diversity and market transparency.
In this contribution, we consider external effects and security of supply as the 
two major drivers for government intervention in energy markets. Both will 
be at the centre of the arguments that follow in the next sections.
3.3  Government intervention is desirable, but how?
Policy makers should give correct incentives to firms to produce and to con-
sumers to consume, but the question is how to do this? Should policy makers 
forbid electricity generation firms to use particular technologies like coal or 
nuclear plants? Should it instead impose to use, or subsidize, other generation 
technologies such as solar photovoltaic cells and wind turbines? Or is it better 
to correct market prices to reflect external costs and let producers and consu-
mers decide for themselves?
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Generally speaking, the economics literature is very sceptical about using 
mandatory technology regulations, because of two major arguments3. First, 
firms are much better informed than policy makers when it comes to taking 
investments decisions. They have a better informed view on technical fea-
sibility and on the exact investment, operational and maintenance costs of 
production technologies. Policy makers thus have a structural information 
disadvantage which could have as a consequence that expensive production 
technologies are prescribed or cheap technologies are forbidden.
The second argument is based on the cost implications of technology regulati-
ons as these would restrict the set of allowed production alternatives that are 
available to producers. In the case of electricity generation, this will result in 
higher electricity generation costs, or in situations where emission reduction 
measures are not implemented where they are cheapest.
It should therefore not be surprising that most economists are not in favour 
of using technology regulations, which they label as a non-market based po-
licy instrument. They prefer using market based instruments instead. Mar-
ket-based measures have as an effect that generation activities and primary 
resources that cause relatively larger external effects are discouraged (but not 
forbidden outright) compared to cleaner technologies and primary fuels.
In the context of environmental policy making, two important market based 
instruments exist: emission taxes and emissions trading. Both policy instru-
ments are market based in the sense that the pricing signal for electricity is 
corrected such that all relevant social costs and benefits are internalized. Profit 
maximizing electricity producers will select a technology mix that minimizes 
the total cost of production and, because external effects are priced in, private 
and societal objectives are aligned. 
Market based policy instruments contain much more guarantees than tech-
nology regulation measures that the overall allocation of emission reduction 
efforts is cost efficient. Figure 3 illustrates this point. Assuming that nuclear, 
coal and gas technologies cause environmental externalities, and renewable 
energy sources do not, we can easily trace out the marginal social cost curve of 
electricity production. The difference in marginal external costs between gas 
and coal are so substantial in Figure 3 that these technologies switch position 
in the cost curve compared to Figure 2. If electricity producers are confronted 
with these external costs, for instance by means of externality taxes or trada-
ble emission permits, then they will prefer to use gas over coal technology in 
Figure 3. The advantage of this system, compared to an outright ban on coal 
fired power plants, is that the mechanism can easily adapt to changing market 
3 See also the contribution by Fischer (2010) in this book.
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conditions. If the market price for gas relative to coal increases, the picture can 
reverse and electricity producers have an incentive to adjust their production 
plans in the appropriate way. A technology ban would not be able to adjust as 
easily to changing market conditions. 
Are green subsidies desirable environmental policy instruments?
In principle, also subsidies for emission reduction measures can foster cost 
efficiency. However, economists are usually weary of subsidies because (1) 
they are expensive (usually, distortionary taxes on for instance labour are 
required to raise the necessary budget for the subsidies) and (2) if badly 
designed, they are implicit subsidies for consuming the underlying good 
or service. Government subsidies for the development of nuclear reactors 
lead to lower production costs and ultimately consumer prices of electrici-
ty. Hence, they stimulate consumers to use more electricity and to care less 
about energy efficiency. Also, there exist a lot of examples where massive 
subsidies have led to market distortions, worse than the original externa-
lity they were intended to cure, as the following quote from The Econo-
mist (2008) illustrates: America’s huge ethanol subsidies, for instance, have led 
to overinvestment in the businesses, which is now experiencing a sharp bust, and 
have helped drive up the price of food, with painful consequences for the world’s 
poor. Germany’s generous solar subsidies covered the roofs of one of the world’s 
most sunless countries with solar cells, thus pushing up the price of silicon and 
reducing the cost-effectiveness of solar power in countries where it actually makes 
sense. Both subsidies promoted the wrong technologies; both wasted taxpayers’ 
money. [italics added]
For all of these reasons, many environmental economists are no strong sup-
porters of green subsidies. Some, including the OECD (2005), even suggest 
that cutting down “harmful” subsidies (like subsidies for coal production 
for instance) could generate cheap environmental benefits. This does not 
imply that all kinds of green technology subsidies should be banned. Fi-
scher (2008) discusses this issue in more detail.
However, from a politicians point of view, subsidies are attractive because 
(1) they allow to serve special interest groups and (2) giving, instead of ta-
king away, money is likely to foster one’s popularity and hence re-election 
chances. During the recent recession, green subsidies gained some attention 
and were seen as means to foster both economic recovery and a transition 
towards a more greener economy. However, even in these circumstances, 
the fundamental criticisms explained higher, continue to apply.
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Figure 3: Price and production level when externalities are internalized
As for security of supply, the selected policy instruments should also aim at 
the optimal use of price signals to steer the long run producer and consumer 
decisions. As security of supply is a public good that will be undersupplied 
if left to private initiative only, some form of government intervention is re-
quired. In the short run, some additional instruments can help to mitigate the 
immediate implications of supply interruptions. Short run security of supply 
can for example be enhanced by a coordinated use of energy stocks, redirec-
ted supply flows or demand side management. These latter measures all have 
the purpose to alleviate the immediate consequences of physical interruptions 
of energy supplies. Also for these short run measures, the goal should be to 
direct scarce supplies to their most highly valued applications. In the long 
run, the best possible strategy for a country to guarantee security of supply is 
to diversify its energy sources. Public support for investments in transmission 
networks (electricity or gas) with neighbouring countries or, for instance, a 
LNG terminal would be one option to achieve this.
4.  Implications for nuclear power
In the previous paragraphs we argued that good reasons exist for policy ma-
kers to intervene in energy markets. Market power, environmental externali-
ties and security of supply arguments warrant intervention but this interven-
tion should not result in mandating which technology should, or should not, 
be used. Rather, regulation should make sure that all, i.e. private and external, 
costs are being correctly attributed to different electricity generation techno-
logies. It was argued that with respect to electricity generation, environmental 
damage and security of supply are two of the most important reasons for 
government intervention. In this section, we will briefly discuss how nuclear 
power contributes to (solving) these market failures, which is equivalent to 
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identifying the major elements that differentiate nuclear from the traditional 
technologies.
4.1  Security of supply
Recent definitions of security of supply distinguish four dimensions: availa-
bility (geological presence), accessibility (geopolitical elements), acceptability 
(environmental elements) and affordability (economic elements), see Kruyt, et 
al. (2009). In this contribution, we only consider availability and accessibility 
as elements of security of supply. Essentially, nuclear power contributes to 
both. The third and the fourth dimension, acceptability and affordability, will 
be covered separately.
Availability
The first and probably the most agreed upon dimension of security of supply 
is that of the availability of resources. According to BP (2009), the existing eco-
nomic reserves (i.e. exploitable in a profitable way) of oil and gas will last for 
3 to 5 decades, assuming current consumption levels. For coal, the situation is 
better: it can be found worldwide and, at current consumption levels, reserves 
are sufficient to cover demand for more than a century. For uranium resour-
ces, at current consumption levels, economic reserves are sufficient for at least 
100 years4. In addition, it is possible to reprocess nuclear fuel (recycling) and 
to use thorium as fuel for nuclear plants. This would delay exhaustion of the 
stocks with several hundreds of years. In short, in terms of available reserves 
of fuel, nuclear power plants face no large problems.
Accessibility
The second dimension of security of supply is the geopolitical dimension or 
accessibility. Accessibility focuses on the economic, social and political stability 
of the countries and regions that own natural resources. Oil and gas reserves 
throughout the world are mainly concentrated in a relatively small number 
of countries, most of them concentrated in the same region (the Middle East). 
Moreover, these countries try to reinforce their market dominance by coor-
dinating their decisions. The OPEC cartel, and the recent attempt to create a 
similar organization for gas-producing countries, are examples of this. In Eu-
rope, the gas conflict between the Russian federation and the transit countries 
Ukraine and Belarus are another example of the vulnerability of the European 
economies for Russian gas supplies. The best way to mitigate this vulnerabi-
4 EU Energy Portal http://www.energy.eu.
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lity is diversification. This can be done in a number of ways: diversifying over 
supplying countries is one way, diversifying over technologies is a second one 
(Morbee and Proost (2010)).
Accessibility was probably one of the major drivers for energy policies in the 
seventies. The two oil crises have indeed shown in a painful manner that nati-
onal economies were very vulnerable because, for their energy supplies, they 
depended almost exclusively on fossil fuels originating from a limited num-
ber of countries.
Table 3: Uranium production and resources
Share of resources 
%
Share of production 
%
Australia  23.0  21
Canada  7.7  23
United States  6.2  4
Namibia  5.0  7
Niger  5.0  8
South Africa  8.0  1
Kazakhstan  14.9  16
Russian Federation  10.0  8
Uzbekistan  2.0  6
Ukraine  3.6  2
Source: NEA (2008)
Nuclear power contributes to the availability as well as to the accessibility 
dimension. On the one hand the available uranium resources are geograp-
hically well scattered throughout the world, which is in contrast to the oil 
reserves and to a lesser degree to the gas reserves, see Table 3. Because of this, 
the impact of a regional conflict on the uranium supplies is strongly reduced. 
Several important producers are OECD countries where the political situation 
is considered to be very stable. On the other hand our dependence on fossil 
fuel technologies (and thus fossil fuel reserves) is also reduced when using 
nuclear power. Clearly, the latter is not an exclusive characteristic of nuclear 
power but also applies to locally produced renewable energy. The bottom line 
is that, the wider the portfolio of primary energy sources that is used, the less 
dependent one becomes of single energy sources.
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Finally, note that, in comparison with traditional fossil fuel plants, only rela-
tively small quantities of fuel are necessary to run a nuclear power plant. The 
high energy density of nuclear fuel makes that transport and storage of the 
fuel can be organized easily. For example, it requires 1kg of coal to generate 
approximately 3kWh of electricity. With 1kg of oil one produces approxima-
tely 4kWh of electricity and with 1kg uranium 50.000 kWh of electricity. Be-
cause of this, most nuclear plants are refuelled only once a year so that they 
have a strategic uranium stock integrated in the power station.
4.2 Acceptability
Some authors see acceptability as another dimension of security of supply. 
However, we prefer to consider acceptability separately. In our view accep-
tability refers to the environmental impact of using energy, to the public per-
ception regarding particular technologies and to the threat of terrorism. The 
environmental impacts are diverse and relate to emissions of – among others 
– SO2, CO2, NOx and particulate matter, but also to waste and accident risks 
resulting from the electricity generation process.
Emissions
In its most recent report on climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (2008) concludes that the “Warming of the climate system is un-
equivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and 
ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea 
level”. Moreover it concludes that “most of the observed increase in global average 
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely (+90% probability) due to 
the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations”. The IPCC estimates 
that CO2 emissions should be reduced to about 13 Gt per year in 2050 in order 
to keep the average temperature increase within acceptable ranges. With a 
worldwide emission level of 27 Gt in 2005 and a business as usual estimate of 
60 Gt of emissions in 2050, this implies that annual emissions should be redu-
ced dramatically, even compared to current emission levels.
The IPCC study also shows that about a quarter of CO2 emissions originates 
from electrical power plants. It is therefore clear that the power sector should 
also contribute in reducing worldwide emissions. In order to do this, the set 
of alternative policies to reduce CO2-emissions in power generation is limi-
ted. Essentially, one could take measures to reduce electricity demand, one 
could capture CO2 that is produced while generating electricity or one could 
increase the share of primary fuels with low carbon content in the electricity 
generation mix. With respect to the last option, two alternatives are available: 
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Windfall profits from free carbon permits
In Belgium, and probably also in other European member states, there 
is currently a debate on the electricity companies pricing the cost of CO2 
emission permits into the sales price of electricity. Since 2005, large com-
bustion installations of fossil fuels, hence also fossil fuel power stations, are 
covered by a European system of tradable carbon emission permits, the so-
called ETS (Emission Trading Scheme). For more details on this system, we 
refer to the contribution of Eyckmans and Rousseau in this book. In most 
EU member states, including Belgium, the electricity producers have been 
allocated “short”, meaning that they received less permits than their actual 
emissions of carbon. These permits were mostly grandfathered, i.e. given 
for free, to the electricity producers.
Most power producers have passed through the price of carbon to their 
consumers via an increase in the sales price of electricity. The debate re-
volves around the observation that power companies charge consumers 
for the extra cost of carbon although they received a large fraction of the 
required emission permits for free. For instance, according to Belgian elec-
tricity market regulator CREG, the Belgian power producers would have 
made a windfall profit of about €1,665 million over a period of five years 
because of these free carbon emission permits, see CREG (2010a).
We would like to make two observations about this argument. First, it 
should not come as a surprise that power producers price the cost of car-
bon into the sales price of their product. Economic theory tells us that cost 
increases will be passed through to consumers relatively more if demand 
for the product is more inelastic. Demand for electricity is typically rather 
increase the use of renewables or increase the use of nuclear. Both produce 
low emissions of CO2 when compared with fossil fuels.
Clearly, nuclear power alone will not be sufficient to close the estimated emis-
sion gap between the business as usual level of 60 Gt and the target level of 
13 Gt in 2050. Increased efficiency in the production and use of electricity, 
renewable energy sources, carbon capture and storage, and an expansion of 
the nuclear capacity will all be required to reduce CO2 emissions sufficiently.
Nuclear power also has an advantage over other fossil fuels when it comes 
to other types of emissions such as sulphur dioxide and particulate matter. In 
terms of emissions, the major disadvantage of nuclear power is radioactive 
emissions. However, from an overall perspective, it has been calculated that 
nuclear power is one of the most effective power production technologies for 
avoiding emission-related health effects (NEA (2008), p. 114).
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Waste treatment
An important issue in the context of nuclear power is the treatment of nuclear 
waste. Several categories of nuclear waste can be distinguished, ranging from 
low to highly radioactive waste. Each waste category requires another type of 
treatment but the largest scientific and technical challenge is to find safe pro-
cessing techniques and procedures for the highly radioactive part.
The risk of contamination (radioactivity) decreases over time but, depending 
on the type of waste, the length varies between a few hundreds of years up 
to more than 100,000 years. In terms of volumes, the largest part of the waste 
flow is composed of low- to medium-radioactive waste. The volumes of high-
ly radioactive waste are relatively small, even though they contain as much 
as 95% of produced radioactivity. Proponents of nuclear power consider the 
concentrated volumes as an advantage, as this allows storing the waste in 
geographically concentrated areas, which in turn allows permanent and easy 
supervision of the nuclear waste volumes.
price insensitive (in the short run, consumers have almost no alternative) 
and hence a high pass through rate is to be expected. Moreover, the fact 
that most of the permits were given for free does not mean that they would 
have no opportunity cost. Instead of using the permits to cover emissions 
of their own installations, the permits could have been sold at the prevai-
ling permit price and this constitutes a clear opportunity cost for a profit 
maximizing firm. There are also indications that power companies have 
seriously taken into account the cost of carbon in their daily operations. 
Since 2005, emissions of carbon have a price in the EU that power produ-
cers have to take into account when deciding on the use of their fossil fuel 
fired power plants. Delarue, et al. (2008) estimate that fuel switching from 
coal fired to gas fired power plants accounted for a reduction in CO2 emis-
sions of about 88 and 59 MtonCO2 in the whole of the EU power sector in 
2005 and 2006 respectively. 
Secondly, environmental economists are happy that some of the external 
costs of carbon are reflected in the consumer price of electricity. In fact, 
that is what we want in order for consumers to change their behaviour 
and switch to more energy efficient appliances or limit their overall con-
sumption of electricity. Price signals including charges for environmental 
externalities are crucial to give incentives to users of polluting goods and 
services to change their behaviour and to achieve ambitious climate policy 
targets in the future. Therefore, we believe that a high pass through rate is 
rather a blessing than a curse.
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The largest scientific and technical challenge lies in finding a method for con-
ditioning the nuclear waste, which offers a sufficient guarantee for the en-
vironment and public health, not only for current but also for many future 
generations to come. Two options are available to process the nuclear waste 
flow. The first is to recycle part of the nuclear waste to be reused again as nu-
clear fuel. The advantage is that the waste flow can be reduced with a factor 
5. The disadvantage is that the reprocessing of nuclear waste requires an extra 
number of treatments and operations, among others the transport to the re-
processing site. This increases the risk of accidents and thus imposes an extra 
cost in order to reduce this risk to a minimum. The second alternative is to 
treat the nuclear waste without recycling and to store it, after a cooling period 
of at least 50 years (at the surface), in deep geological formations.
Until a few decades ago, the first alternative with maximal recycling was pre-
ferred. However, the additional risks (transport to reprocessing factory, the 
proliferation of plutonium) and the resulting extra costs have brought the se-
cond alternative at the foreground again5. Moreover, in the public debate, (the 
risks of) nuclear waste treatment, much more than the accident risk of nuclear 
electricity generation, is seen as an issue, which brings us to the public percep-
tion problem discussed in the next section.
In our view, nuclear waste is the most problematic issue related to the use of 
nuclear energy. Storing such hazardous waste for many thousands of years 
is problematic since we cannot control how future societies will deal with it. 
Chances are high that wars or other major social crisis will affect the storage 
sites somewhere in the distant future. However, this cannot be much of an 
argument against the continued use of nuclear energy. Since humankind has 
already been using nuclear energy for several decades, considerable amounts 
of highly radioactive waste are currently waiting for a permanent solution. 
Keeping existing nuclear power plants open for a longer time than initially 
planned, will only add to an already existing stockpile of waste. Very costly 
geological storage sites will have to be (and are already being) build anyway, 
independent of the question whether we continue to use nuclear energy or 
not. Given that these storage facilities have to be build anyway, the marginal 
cost of storing additional waste from future nuclear energy use is small. 
Given the huge costs involved, it seems to us that there are important eco-
nomies of scale in the storage of nuclear waste. However, current legislation 
forces every country to find a solution for its waste within its own territory. 
From an international perspective, this restriction causes huge extra costs and 
it is not clear to us that it would enhance the overall safety of the storage. 
5 See for example MIT (2003), The Future or Nuclear Power: An interdisciplinary MIT study, 
Massachusetts, p. 180. French experts however seem to rather prefer the first path.
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We therefore plead strongly for more international collaboration, and even 
trade, in nuclear waste such that waste can be stored in the geologically 
most suitable and safe locations at the lowest (but still huge) cost possible. 
Of course, strict government control is necessary to avoid that nuclear waste 
would be dumped in countries that have not the appropriate means to treat 
and store it safely. The bottom line of our argument is that the artificial res-
triction to store one’s own waste, increases costs strongly and does not always 
lead to a safer storage. 
4.3  Other acceptability issues
Public perception
For policy makers it is difficult to ignore the population’s attitude regarding 
nuclear power. In a democratic state, preferences of citizens should count of 
course. But, one should realize that, among other things, this attitude is for-
med by what people know, or think they know, about the different aspects 
of nuclear energy (safety, nuclear waste management, proliferation, environ-
ment impact, available alternatives, …). 
The question is whether the attitude and perception of the general public is 
based on sufficient and correct information. Surveys show that respondents 
are not always well informed when it concerns energy and the use of energy. 
Supplying additional and correct information to the respondents often results 
in revised opinions and preference reversals. Research shows that in the US 
the attitude towards nuclear power is mainly driven by the perception of the 
public with regards to nuclear waste, security and the costs of the technology. 
In addition, the research shows that the public opinion does not see the link 
between nuclear power and the greenhouse gas problem. 
Concerning risk attitude, it is well documented in the literature, see for ins-
tance Hanley, et al. (2007), that people tend to overestimate low risk situations 
(risk of living near a nuclear power plant) and underestimate high risk situa-
tion (risk of driving a car). Also, psychological experiments show that people 
strongly dislike situations that cannot be controlled (compare travelling by an 
airplane versus driving a car oneself for instance).
All these elements might lead to a biased public perception of nuclear energy. 
We therefore believe that there is still an important role for government agen-
cies to provide correct and objective information about all aspects of nuclear 
(and other) energy sources. Leaving this information provision to the stake-
holders themselves typically results in a polarization between advocates and 
opponents and biased information campaigns. But, many observers also con-
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clude that a shift in public opinion pro nuclear can only be realized to the ex-
tent that the nuclear industry succeeds in improving the nuclear technology, 
such that the waste problem and the safety problem is solved or reduced as 
much as possible6.
Target of terrorism
Since the terrorists’ attack of 11 September 2001, the argument of the threat 
of terrorism against nuclear installations has frequently been used. On the 
one hand the danger exists that terrorists would choose an existing nuclear 
plant as a target. On the other hand there is a fear that radioactive material 
would fall in the hands of terrorists, who could then produce a so-called dirty 
bomb. In The Economist of 16 October 2003, Mohamed El Baradei, head of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, together with Hans Blix, 
leader of the UN observers in Iraq, expressed his concern regarding the wide 
dispersion of nuclear weapons and radioactive material (El Baradei (2003)).
Against the first argument, the possibility that an existing nuclear plant 
would be the target of an attack by terrorists, proponents of nuclear power 
respond by saying that nuclear plants have to obey to very strict construction 
and safety standards. The plants are constructed such that they can bear the 
crash of a large plane without radioactivity leaking into the environment. On 
the other hand, opponents have doubts on the level of construction standards 
that is being imposed on the construction of nuclear plants. Beyond doubt, the 
events of Nine-Eleven will lead to more stringent construction standards for 
nuclear installations in the future.
Regarding the second argument, the possibility that terrorists can put their 
hands on radioactive material, Mohamed El Baradei pleads for increased ef-
forts in international monitoring of civil nuclear plants, for the development 
of techniques and technologies that make it difficult to steal radioactive ma-
terial or waste from nuclear applications, and for more intense international 
cooperation regarding storage and monitoring of nuclear waste.
In our opinion, decisions taken by individual governments of EU countries 
will contribute very little to a solution for the security risk. Decisions must 
be taken and solutions should be agreed upon at the international level, with 
strict monitoring by independent organization like the IAEA and Euratom. 
Within these international organizations, individual countries should actively 
work towards and contribute to developing solutions in line with El Bara-
dei’s proposals. The problem with nuclear material is mainly related to badly 
6 See MIT (2003), The Future or Nuclear Power: An interdisciplinary MIT study, Massachusetts, 
p. 180.
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monitored civilian and military nuclear installations in former centrally plan-
ned economies. More international assistance is needed in order to clean up 
these sites and store the nuclear material in safe places under internationally 
recognized supervision. As with the nuclear waste problem, we are convinced 
that a nuclear phase out will not reduce the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear 
installation or the threat of a dirty bomb. Even if all nuclear energy would be 
phased out, a large number of decommissioned reactors and nuclear waste 
repositories will have to be protected from terrorist attacks of theft of nuclear 
material. In economists’ language, the marginal effect of a nuclear phase out 
on the threat of terrorism is close to zero. 
5.  Assessing the private and external costs
A correct evaluation and assessment of the cost of the energy system is im-
portant. This requires that the above mentioned elements are correctly valued 
and taken into account. In section 3, we argued that policy makers should 
leave technology choices to the private sector and should limit themselves to 
giving correct price signals, which implies that current and future private and 
external costs are taken into account. Moreover, as these costs are spread over 
time, the time value of money becomes important, which raises the issue of 
discounting.
5.1  Private costs
When assessing the private cost, two cost elements should be considered: in-
vestment costs and operational and maintenance costs.
Investment costs
A nuclear plant is more costly to build compared to a traditional coal or gas 
plant. According to IEA (2005), per installed kW of generation capacity, a PWR 
(Pressurized Water Reactor) nuclear plant, costs approximately €1,500. One 
kW of generation capacity in a coal or gas plant costs approximately €1,250 
and €600 respectively. In terms of investment cost per kW, nuclear is clearly 
more expensive but this disadvantage is largely compensated by the relati-
vely low fuel cost of nuclear plants.
The higher investment costs for nuclear plants make that these plants are in-
teresting only if they have very low operation costs. Next to some technical 
reasons, this is one of the major reasons to use nuclear plants for base load 
generation. With the exception of short maintenance periods, nuclear power 
plants usually operate continuously. However, other options exist to produce 
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base load power. From a technical point of view, it is perfectly possible to re-
place the nuclear base load capacity by for example gas or coal plants. But, as 
a consequence, CO2 emissions would increase strongly.
Antagonists of nuclear energy often propose the use of renewable energy and 
combined heat and power (CHP) as an alternative for the nuclear plants. Ho-
wever, currently, these technologies cannot take over the role of nuclear plants 
to produce base load for two reasons. First of all, the effective available capa-
city of many renewable energy sources (wind, hydro, biomass and photovol-
taic applications) depends on weather conditions and is therefore uncertain. 
Even if a nuclear plant would be replaced by a large scale wind farm, then one 
should at the same time foresee in backup capacity via traditional large scale 
coal or gas plants. These backup plants must generate electricity in the peri-
ods with little wind or sun. Secondly, the investment costs of many renewable 
energy technologies are relatively high ranging from about €1,700 / kW for 
offshore wind farms to more than €4,000 / kW for photovoltaic solar energy 
according to IEA (2005).
Fuel, operational and maintenance costs
Apart from investment costs, private costs also include fuel, operation and 
maintenance costs. Under normal assumptions regarding life span and avai-
lability, the cost of one ‘nuclear’ kWh covers 70% capital outlay, 10% fuel char-
ges and 20% operation and maintenance costs. For a coal or gas plant, the 
share of fuel charges in the kWh costs can increase to 45% and 80% respecti-
vely according to IEA (2005). The IEA study reports a wide variety of different 
technologies for different OECD countries and it is difficult to summarize the 
private cost estimates in one number. But, generally speaking, the IEA study 
shows that a kWh of electricity can be generated most cheaply using nuclear, 
followed by coal, gas, wind and solar energy sources. However, this ranking 
depends on many assumptions, in particular the prices of gas and coal are 
crucially important for the ranking of nuclear, gas and coal technology. Com-
pared to other studies (for instance the ExternE study7), the IEA (2005) es-
timates tend to use relatively high prices for fossil fuels which explains the 
comparative advantage of nuclear energy in their results.
7 See the ExternE website: http://www.externe.info/ for details. It should be noted that all 
monetary values of the ExternE study refer to 1998. A recent and extensive comparative study 
by the Belgian energy regulator CREG (2010b) retains a value of €5.08/MWh as central esti-
mate for the external costs of nuclear energy.
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5.2 External costs
In order to assess the full social costs of electricity generation, we also need 
an estimate of external costs. Several studies have assessed the importance 
and the size of external effects caused by electricity generation. In this respect, 
the pioneering European ExternE study is an important reference point. This 
project developed methodologies to value external costs related to energy 
production technologies and applied them to several EU member states. The 
study assesses and values the external effects related to different electricity 
generation technologies, including nuclear, and reports on external cost es-
timates under different hypotheses concerning discount rates, time horizon, 
estimates of future climate damage etc. An important conclusion from this 
study is that external effects from electricity generation are non-negligible and 
highly different for different generation technologies.
ExternE estimates of external costs
According to the ExternE (1999) results, the lowest external costs per MWh of 
electricity production are associated with the renewable energy sources wind 
(€1.5/MWh) and photovoltaic solar (€2.4/MWh). Next in the order comes 
nuclear energy with approximately €4.5/MWh, against €17.4/MWh for a 
gas fired power plant and up to more than €56/MWh for traditional fossil 
fuel plants using coal or oil8. The ExternE estimates are shown in Figure 4. The 
numbers quoted higher are the averages of the different individual country 
and installation estimates in ExternE (1999). In the graph we also report the 
maximum and minimum values. The reason for the large spread for fossil fuel 
plants has to do with the precise technological details. A gas fired combined 
cycle power plant (STAG plant) is more efficient and produces therefore less 
external costs per MWh of electricity production than a more traditional gas 
fired plant equipped with only a gas turbine.
8 See CREG (2010b).
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Figure 4: External cost estimates (ExternE (1999))
Figure 5 reports the combined private and external costs of electricity genera-
tion technologies according to ExternE (1999)9. As we can see, gas, nuclear and 
biomass are comparable in terms of social costs and are the cheapest energy 
sources from a societal point of view. Nuclear is the most expensive of the 
three in terms of private costs only but makes up for that disadvantage by 
its modest external cost. Private costs of wind energy have fallen (and are 
expected to fall further in the future) as more experience is accumulated with 
the technology. Wind energy is therefore becoming a competitive alternative 
to the three cheapest sources. Other fossil fuel based technologies (oil and 
gas) are less interesting from a societal point of view because of their relati-
vely high external costs. Finally, photovoltaic power is much more expensive 
than any other technology. Even if prices of PV cells drop even further in the 
future, their relatively low power output makes it very expensive to produce 
one kWh of electricity. PV technology is therefore, from a societal point of 
view, to be considered as a marginal technology but with some interesting 
niche applications. 
9 Note the difference with Figure 2 in which only marginal costs (mainly fuel, operational and 
maintenance costs) were shown because it refers to the short run decision problem of using 
existing energy power plants. Figure 5 refers however to the long run in which one has to 
decide whether and what type of power plants to build.
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Figure 5: Full social cost estimates ExternE (1999)
Many caveats apply to these numbers. For instance, private cost estimates are 
subject to considerable uncertainty of, mainly, fossil fuel prices and the exter-
nal costs depend strongly on the assumed shadow cost of carbon emissions. 
One also has to take into account that some renewables shown here are cheap 
(for example, onshore wind along the cost) but have limited potential, such 
as, for example, inland wind power which is much more expensive. Also, 
other arguments than mere costs should play in the choice of technology, for 
instance base load power and security of supply arguments. As a comparison, 
a more recent MIT study (footnote 6) gives qualitatively similar results. Ac-
cording to this last study the capital cost and the operational costs (without 
taking into account external costs) of nuclear plants are higher than those of 
gas fired STAG plants, even with high gas prices. However, when the external 
cost of greenhouse gases is taken into account, nuclear power becomes more 
competitive. But as a general conclusion, we can say that: (1) nuclear power 
is among the cheapest electricity generation technologies, even when taking 
into account external costs, (2) renewable energy from biomass and wind has 
become a more competitive source of power supply, (3) gas and oil fired po-
wer plants have comparable private costs but they are characterized by high 
external costs compared to nuclear, gas, biomass and wind, and (4) photovol-
taic power is much more expensive and its share will remain marginal in the 
overall technology mix.
Extreme damage at accidents
The nuclear accident in Chernobyl has made the public opinion very sensitive 
for accidents with nuclear plants. In theory, techniques are available to assess 
the external cost of accidents as long as sufficient observations are available 
from the past. However, in the case of nuclear power this is not possible. With 
the exception of Chernobyl (1986) and Three Mile Island (1979), no nuclear 
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accidents have been documented and reported. In practice, one then proceeds 
to risk-assessment where experts give their judgment concerning the accident 
risk in each step of the nuclear generation process. This was the approach 
taken in the ExternE study mentioned before. The resulting cost estimate is 
in the range of €10.4/MWh down to less than €0.2/MWh for accidents with 
less serious radioactive contamination. We should also point out that not all 
expected accident costs are to be considered as external costs. Electricity gene-
rating firms are, at least partially, subject to liability regulation in the case of 
damages caused by an accident (Percebois (2003)). This liability ensures that 
at least part of the accident costs are already included in the private electricity 
generation costs. Only that part of the accident costs which exceeds the costs 
covered by the liability regulation, must be considered as an external costs.
Experts in cost-benefit analysis will point out that the traditional methodo-
logy of assessing expected costs (expected damage equals the probability of 
an accident times the total damage) is problematic for situations in which very 
small probabilities of an accident are combined with very large damages. In 
decision theory, this problem is known as the Sint-Petersburg paradox which 
was described in 1738, by the Swiss mathematician Bernoulli. Entering into 
the details of this paradox would lead us too far, but the paradox is frequently 
quoted to question the use of the expected value concept for assessing the risk 
of situations in which large damages go together with extremely low proba-
bilities10. However, this point was also addressed in the ExternE methodology 
by considering various degrees of risk aversion.
Decommissioning
The private cost of nuclear plants already includes – some will say partly – 
provisions for the decommissioning of nuclear plants and the processing of 
the nuclear waste. As a rule of thumb, NEA (2003) states that decommissio-
ning a nuclear plant would cost 10 to 15% of the investment cost. Currently, 
Belgian electricity generators are contributing to a special fund to finance the 
cost of decommissioning and of nuclear waste storage11. These financial con-
tributions have been settled via the electricity price and, consequently, are 
not to be considered as external costs. Whether these provisions are sufficient 
to cover all future costs remains open for debate. In any case, these decom-
missioning costs, which are external costs for traditional plants and (at least 
partially) internal for nuclear plants, have been (partly) taken into account in 
10 The solution proposed by Bernoulli is to use a concave transformation rather than the ex-
pected damage itself. However, this procedure also has its problems. The interested reader is 
referred to http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-stpetersburg.
11 See CREG (2001). This is a study concerning the provisions and funds in the nuclear sector that 
can be downloaded from the CREG website: www.creg.be.
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the investment decision process of the generation firms. It is only to the extent 
that this fund is insufficient to pay for the nuclear waste treatment and the 
decommissioning, that the extra costs should be attributed as external costs 
to the nuclear sector.
Discounting
Assessing the cost of nuclear waste treatment is difficult because the storage 
costs extend over a very long period of time. In cost-benefit analysis, the tra-
ditional way to take into account the time value of money is via discoun-
ting. This technique starts from the assumption that people prefer one euro 
today rather than one euro next year. For this reason, when calculating the 
total sum of all costs and benefits over many periods in time, weights smal-
ler than one are given to future monetary values. These weights decrease as 
the costs or profits are situated further in the future. For example, a discount 
rate of 3% (this is the discount rate used in the ExternE study) would imply a 
weight of 0.000,000,015 for a costs of 1 million euro to be paid in 1000 years. 
In other words, large costs in the distant future are wiped out almost entirely 
by the traditional discount method. For this reason it is important to assess 
the sensitivity of the cost-benefit approach for changes in the value of vital 
parameters, such as the discount rate. For example, the ExternE study pre-
sents external cost estimates for discount values ranging between 3% and 0%. 
But questions remain, even with a discount rate equal to zero. For example, 
Kneese and Schulze (1985) argue that using discounting for problems such as 
nuclear waste is not neutral for the normative framework within which the 
analysis happens. In particular it is argued that discounting is justified only 
under very restrictive hypotheses, among others the possibility to compensa-
te future generations for possible damages they would suffer in case a nuclear 
storage site would start leaking.
However, discounting problems are not unique for nuclear power, they also 
occur when other electricity generation technologies that produce greenhouse 
gases are assessed. Nuclear power causes long term problems because the 
highly radioactive waste needs to be stored hundreds of thousands of years 
before the radiation level falls back to an acceptable level. With greenhouse 
gas emissions, future climate changes will result in environmental damage 
that falls upon future generations in the coming centuries. In other words, 
the claim that the valuation of the long run consequences of nuclear waste is 
impossible, actually also applies to technologies based on burning fossil fuels. 
Consequently, this argument does not allow to discriminate between nuclear 
power and more traditional electricity generation methods.
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5.5  One cannot have it all the same time
The major drivers for the renewed interest in nuclear are its potential con-
tribution to a climate change solution and to improved security of supply. We 
argued before that both issues justify government intervention. However, 
realizing both objectives will put an upward pressure on the cost of electri-
city production. At the same time, there is also a political pressure to reduce 
energy prices for end-users as it is perceived by politicians that the electricity 
market liberalization increases efficiency and thus creates room for price re-
ductions. Many politicians find that the liberalization of energy markets has 
failed in this respect and that firms charge too high prices. Consequently, po-
litical pressure is large to impose upper limits on these prices. It is obvious 
that the climate change and security of supply objective are likely to be incompa-
tible with the objective of lower electricity prices. Phasing out nuclear would 
only contribute to the incompatibility by limiting the available technological 
options to achieve CO2 emission reductions and security of supply. Surely, 
and especially in developed economies, a nuclear phase-out can technically 
be implemented and absorbed but one should not expect at the same time a 
decrease in the cost of electricity.
Although, we are not aware of any study that looks into the cost impact of 
achieving both a GHG emission reduction target and a security of supply tar-
get together with a ban on nuclear, there are a number of studies that assess 
the cost impact on the energy system of phasing out nuclear in the presence 
of a GHG emission constraint. Imposing an additional security of supply con-
straint would only further increase the cost of a nuclear phase out.
Belgian perspective
Several Belgian studies have attempted to make an overall evaluation of the 
cost evolution of the Belgian energy system when nuclear power is phased 
out12.
From this study it appears that, for the specific Belgian context and taking 
into account private as well as external costs, nuclear power is one of the che-
apest technologies for the production of electricity. The study mainly takes 
into account environment-related external costs and the accident risk. Other 
elements pro or contra nuclear, such as its contribution to security of supply 
and base load production, increased risk of terrorism and proliferation and 
the negative public perception are not considered in this exercise.
12 See the report of the Commisie voor de Analyse van de Productiemiddelen van Elektriciteit 
en de Reoriëntatie van de Energieverctoren aan de Staatssecretaris voor Energie en duurzame 
Ontwikkeling (Ampere Comissie (2000)). and Bossier, et al. (2008)
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As mentioned before, it is – from a technical perspective – perfectly possible 
to replace the nuclear production capacity by traditional plants. Simulation 
exercises with the MARKAL/TIMES model show that, without Kyoto obli-
gations, this can even be realized at an almost negligible costs for the Belgian 
economy13. In that case, the cost efficient solution implies that mainly coal 
plants would be built to replace the nuclear capacity. However, when emis-
sion constraints for GHG and other pollutants are taken into account, this 
shift is less obvious. Antagonists of nuclear power point out that alternative 
policy options are available at the demand as well as at the supply side of the 
electricity market. At the supply side renewable energy, combined heat and 
power (CHP) and distributed generation are alternatives. At the demand side 
the rational use of energy (energy efficiency) is the main option.
The use of renewable energy as an alternative for the nuclear plants has been 
discussed before. An increased use of CHP no doubt has some potential in 
Belgium, but the use of CHP should be coordinated with applications that 
require heat. CHP applications without heat demand are meaningless.
Taking demand reducing measures can slow down the increase in the de-
mand for electricity. It is to be questioned whether it is realistic to assume that 
rational energy use (REU) measures are able to bend the electricity demand 
in a structural and fundamental way. Moreover the costs (capital outlay, but 
also for example the loss of comfort for end-users) of REU measures should be 
considered when assessing their contribution.
We can therefore conclude that, for Belgium, it is technically perfectly possible 
to phase out nuclear energy without jeopardizing the supply of electricity to 
households and industry. However, it should be noted that in the simulation 
exercises, nuclear power stations are often replaced in the future by coal fired 
plants that are equipped with carbon capture and storage CCS technology. 
This conclusion depends of course on the estimated cost and date of availa-
bility of CCS technologies. In particular, it was assumed that this technology 
would be available by 2025 at a competitive cost. However, many observers 
argue that this is too optimistic.
Global perspective
Vaillancourt, et al. (2008) use a bottom up technology model of the MARKAL 
type (World-TIMES) to assess the long-term role of nuclear power in the world 
13 See Proost and Van Regemorter (2001). These resaearchers estimate the cost of realizing a post-
Kyoto a reduction target of -15% emission (in 2030) relative to the 1990 emissions at 0.5% up to 
1% of the GDP if nuclear plants are not phased-out. The cost of achieving the same reduction 
target with a nuclear phase-out is estimated at 3% of GDP if no international trading in emis-
sions or electricity is allowed.
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energy system if constraints are imposed on CO2-concentrations. The authors 
consider two concentration scenario’s both to be realized in 2100. The first 
scenario assumes a global atmospheric CO2 concentration constraint of 550 
ppmv in 2100, the second one assumes a more stringent concentration target 
of 450 ppmv. World-TIMES is an optimisation model coupled to a detailed da-
tabase of energy technologies and estimates of regional resource availability. 
The model minimizes the total cost of satisfying price elastic demand for ener-
gy services over a horizon of 100 years (2000-2100) in a multi region setting. 
Their analysis shows a growing role for nuclear energy in the long run, es-
pecially at the stringent 450 ppmv level. At the same time, traditional fossil 
fuel power generation technologies lose market share. In the long run, new 
fossil fuel technologies, for instance coal fired power station equipped with 
carbon capture and storage CCS technology, enter the technology mix. Also 
renewable energy sources play an important role to satisfy energy demand in 
the future energy system under a carbon emission constraint. Moreover, Vail-
lancourt, et al. (2008) also show that limiting the role of nuclear in achieving 
the CO2-emission reduction target, would significantly increase the total cost 
of the world energy system. 
In general this, and similar studies like for instance Bosetti, et al. (2009), show 
that at a global scale, nuclear energy is important in the future to meet gro-
wing energy demand, especially in rapidly growing developing countries 
like China and India. Moreover, these studies also show that there is no fun-
damental conflict between nuclear and renewable technologies. Even when 
allowing for nuclear energy, renewable energy sources will gain a substan-
tial market share and will become important sources of power production in 
many regions across the world.
6.  Conclusion
In this contribution we have reviewed the most common arguments that are 
used in the debate on the phase out of nuclear energy in many European 
countries including Belgium. We felt it was necessary to do this because the 
public discussion in Europe is strongly polarized between opponents and 
proponents of the nuclear energy option. In our view, the discussion should 
be based on rational and correct arguments and data and we hope to have 
contributed to an informed public debate. 
We argued that all electricity generation technologies should be faced with 
their correct social – i.e. private and external – costs. Internalizing external 
costs (and benefits) by means of emission taxes, contributions to decommis-
sioning funds etc, is crucial to align private and public interests. In our view, 
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and many other energy and environmental economists, there is still room for 
considerable improvement in this respect. 
Once all production technologies are confronted with their correct social cost, 
economists believe there is little reason for the government to prohibit some 
technologies or prescribe others. It should be left to the electricity producers 
to select the optimal mix of generation technologies to be used because they 
have an important informational advantage over the government to make 
these choices. As long as all relevant social costs are internalized, it is diffi-
cult to argue for government intervention. We therefore do not plead for less 
government intervention, but rather for a more intelligent intervention that 
makes electricity producers responsible without patronizing them. This way 
of acting will probably be more easily accepted by the parties concerned and 
might even allow to pursue more ambitious environmental objectives.
Of course, our argument crucially depends on a reliable estimate of all rele-
vant external costs of electricity generation. In the last decade, considerable 
progress has been made in this domain, both methodologically and empirical-
ly. The estimates (original and updates) of the European ExternE project are 
an important and reliable reference in this respect. Their estimates show that 
there are important external costs associated with the use of nuclear energy. 
However, these costs are small compared to the costs of traditional fossil fuel 
fired power plants, especially when taking into account future climate change 
damages from greenhouse gas emissions. Low external costs, combined with 
relatively low fuel cost, make nuclear energy a viable technology from a socie-
tal point of view. It should be noted that this does not jeopardize the market 
potential of combined heat power or renewable energy sources like wind and 
biomass. These technologies have the strong advantage of low external costs 
and often add to security of domestic energy supply. Independent of the role 
of nuclear, some renewable energy technologies will carve out an important 
market share in electricity market in the future. 
Especially at the global level, exclusion of nuclear energy from the future port-
folio of electricity generation technologies, would have severe consequences 
for energy supply in fast growing developing countries like China and India. 
Without nuclear energy, they will rely more on their cheap and plentiful coal 
resources for base load electricity generation. This would have a very strong 
impact on global greenhouse gas emissions and resulting climate change. 
For developed economies in Europe and North America, things look some-
what different. Studies show that both future electricity demand and inter-
national greenhouse gas emission ceilings can be respected without resorting 
to nuclear energy. However, it should be clear that it is impossible to achieve 
three objectives at the same time: low greenhouse gas emissions, no nuclear 
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power and low electricity consumer prices. Trade offs are to be made. Espe-
cially if one aims at deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions in the future, the 
costs of a nuclear phase out will increase. Whether societies are willing to 
incur that cost, is ultimately a political question. We can only provide rational 
arguments for an informed and open public debate on this issue.
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1.  Introduction
In this chapter we analyze the impact for Belgium of the EU-objectives for 
climate change and renewable energy for 2020. In January 2008, the European 
Commission published its impact assessment on the EU-objectives for climate 
change and renewable energy for 2020. The European Commission decided, 
in its “Climate action and renewable energy package” (EC, 2008), to reduce 
the EU GHG emissions by 20% by 2020 in comparison to 1990, to have a 10% 
share of biofuels in transport and a 20% share for renewables in 2020. 
For climate change, a distinction is made between the ETS sectors with the 
emission trading system at EU level and the non-ETS sectors with targets at 
country level. The EC has decided on an EU target for the ETS with auction-
ing of the permits and a burden sharing between countries for the non-ETS 
sectors to reach the overall 20% reduction target. The renewable target is also 
allocated between countries. The specific targets for Belgium are a reduction 
of 15% CO2eq in 2020 compared to 2005 for the non-ETS sectors and a renew-
able target share of 13% in 2020 (figure 1). In addition, there is a target for 
renewable energy in the transport sector of 10%2. 
Figure 1: Renewable target for EU countries in 2020
This chapter analyzes the renewable energy target for Belgium and its inter-
actions with the climate policy targets. The issue is studied with the Belgian 
TIMES model. 
In the first section of this chapter, the model is explained, in the second sec-
tion, the different scenarios developed for this analysis are described. In a 
third section the results are analysed and the final section concludes.
2 In this analysis simplified to a biofuel target
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
SE SE LV FI AT PT DK EE SI RO FR LT ES DE EL IT BG IE PL UK UK NL SK BE CY CZ HU LU MT
   107
2.  Model and methodology
TIMES is a techno-economic optimisation model which assembles, in a simple 
market context, technological information (conversion efficiency, investment 
and variable costs, emissions, etc.) for the entire energy system. The model is 
developed within an IEA Implementing agreement, ETSAP, in which Belgium 
participates (Loulou et al, 2005). The Belgian version of the model was devel-
oped by CES-K.U.Leuven and VITO with the financing of the Belgian Science 
Policy Office (Van Regemorter and Nijs, 2007 and 2008) 
The model maximises the sum of consumer and producer surplus inside the 
energy system using linear programming. It can simulate the energy demand 
and supply activities with technological detail for a country and also provides 
information on associated emissions and environmental damage. The model 
uses a horizon of up to 40/80 years. In the Belgian version, the time horizon is 
2050. The demand functions for energy services are a function of the activity 
levels per sector and the cost of energy services. The energy services (passen-
ger car km or steel) are produced in the most cost effective way, combining 
demand side technologies (more energy efficient light bulbs, more efficient 
car engines etc.) and supply side technologies (better power stations or refin-
eries). In this way one is able to simulate the potential role of new technolo-
gies in the energy supply and demand in a sector.
The model is dynamic and forward looking in the sense that all choices (use 
of energy services as well as types of technologies) take into account the costs 
and benefits over the whole lifecycle. The discounted welfare includes the 
benefits to all users and producers of energy as well as all variable and invest-
ment costs of delivering energy.
3.  General assumptions and Reference Scenario
3.1  Background Assumptions
The starting point is the construction of the reference scenario. It is important 
to stress the role of this scenario for policy analysis with the TIMES model. 
The reference scenario has not as objective to forecast the development of the 
energy system. It gives a consistent development path for the energy system, 
using a cost optimisation approach and the simplified representation of the 
energy users and suppliers behaviour in TIMES. The reference scenario serves 
as basis to evaluate the cost of policies and their impact on the technologi-
cal choices in the energy system. The reference scenario can therefore deviate 
from the evolution of the energy system in recent years which reflects the real 
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behaviour of the economic agents, their expectations and the dynamic adjust-
ment of the energy system. The main advantage of our approach is therefore a 
consistent treatment of the technologies for policy evaluation. 
The construction of the reference scenario is based on assumptions regarding 
the macroeconomic evolution for Belgium and the World energy prices evolu-
tion till 2050 complemented with energy policy assumptions. 
Macroeconomic assumptions
The macroeconomic background for Belgium was derived with GEM-E3, a 
general equilibrium model for the EU countries. It gives the economic growth 
rates used for deriving the energy service demands in the reference scenario. 
The demand functions are obtained by applying assumptions on the elasticity 
of the sectoral demand with respect to the macroeconomic evolution. The in-
ternational energy prices are those derived in July 2007 with the POLES World 
energy model by IPTS (Russ et al, 2007), a research centre of the European 
Commission, updated with the assumptions in the PRIMES model for the EU 
impact assessment.
Table 1: Macroeconomic Assumptions for Belgium and international energy prices
             3 Unit 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Population %/y 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1%
GDP %/y 2.2% 2.4% 2.2% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2%
Import price crude oil €/GJ 7.8 8.6 9.1 9.6 10.5 11.3 11.7 12.7 13.6
Import price natural gas €/GJ 4.1 4.9 6.1 7.5 7.6 8.2 9.1 9.6 10.9
Import price coal €/GJ 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4
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Renewables potentials
Potentials for renewable resources are an important element in the evaluation 
of the EU targets. The production potential of the different renewables used in 
the model are those proposed by De Ruyck for the ‘Commissie Energie 2030’ 
(De Ruyck, 2006). For biomass, it is assumed that 10% of the arable land in 
Belgium can be used for the production of biocrops, such as wheat or rape-
seed and 30% of the forest for the production of wood. Both types of biomass 
can also be imported. A limit is imposed on their imports though Belgium as 
a small country could benefit from an unlimited supply. Moreover, the supply 
3 The years actually refer to a period in which all model yearss are equal, in this case: 2008-2012
4 All costs and prises in this paper are in €2010
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is assumed to be available at an increasing cost by considering two price steps 
to reflect the pressure of demand when a climate policy would be applied in 
the whole EU.
For wind energy a distinction is made between on and off shore. The cost 
of the grid expansion needed for the implementation of the full potential of 
offshore is included in the cost of the power plants5. The data related to the 
wind technologies and the potentials were also checked with (Devriendt et 
al., 2005).
The table hereafter summarizes the potentials assumed for the different sourc-
es. 
Table 2: Potential for energy sources
Domestic Import
Biomass (PJ) Wood residue 10.8
Wood 22.7 25-83
Biocrops (wheat & rapeseed) 16.5 25-83 for each crop
Wind (GW) Onshore cat1 0.63
Onshore cat2 0.92
Onshore cat3 0.47
Offshore cat1 0.60
Offshore cat2 0.30
Offshore cat3 2.90
Solar (GW, GWth) PV 10
Hot water 3
Carbon capture and storage could be an important option when a high reduc-
tion target is imposed. Geological disposal in deep aquifers and coal sinks is 
modelled for the storage of the removed CO2. A maximum cumulative poten-
tial of 100 Mt of CO2 at a distance less than 20km and of 1000 Mt at higher cost 
is considered. This potential is present in Belgium (Laenen et al., 2004). The 
100 Mt can be captured with high certainty in Belgium; 1000 Mt is uncertain 
(although, if not in Belgium, this could represent foreign sinks).
5 As TIMES is not running in mixed integer mode, binary investment options are not possible. 
The cost is therefore included as a cost per Kwe installed; therefore the cost computation is 
only correct if the full potential is installed.
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General policy assumptions
In the reference scenario, there are no major changes expected in the Belgian 
economic, energy and environmental policies. The nuclear phase-out is im-
plemented. The EU emission trading system (ETS) is assumed to be in place 
and to impose a price of 24 €/ton CO2 after 2015. It has been assumed for this 
modelling exercise that the sectors covered by the ETS would include all the 
industrial sectors and the electricity sector as this seems to reflect the actual 
tendency of enlarging the sectoral participation6. This leaves for the non-ETS 
sectors the residential, service and transport sectors.
In all scenarios, the discount rate is fixed to 4%, reflecting the public sector 
approach in the policy evaluation with TIMES. Policy measures like subsidies 
for energy efficient investment or similar measures implemented in the differ-
ent regions are not explicitly accounted for. We do this to guarantee a consist-
ent comparison of the technologies. It must be mentioned that in the reference 
scenario, the perfect foresight/optimisation approach in TIMES can already 
induce the use of some of the policy-promoted options even in the absence 
of any carbon constraint, as long as they are cost-efficient (the ‘no-regret’ op-
tions). Moreover, the assumption regarding the carbon value for the ETS in 
the reference induces also a shift towards less carbon intensive technologies.
3.2  The Reference Scenario
Given the demand functions for energy services, TIMES optimizes the choice 
of energy processes, the energy efficiency, the choice of fuel by the energy us-
ers as well as the choice of energy production processes by the energy sector. 
The choice is based on the information on the present and future availability 
of energy technologies, their costs and performance at the level of the energy 
user and at the level of the energy producer. It is clear therefore that the en-
ergy path as derived from this optimisation process, takes into account all the 
no-regret options and may therefore slightly underestimate the real growth 
of the energy demand. Other criteria besides cost minimisation driving con-
sumer behaviour are not reflected in this reference. 
The primary energy consumption grows on average at 0.5%. There is a shift 
to solids when coal power plants replace the nuclear power plants. Oil prod-
ucts keep a relatively high share of the energy market because they remain 
the dominant fuel in the transport sector. Renewable energy , with a market 
share of 0.8%, does not really penetrate and is actually lower than today’s 
share of renewable energy because the model is calibrated to the 2000 data. 
6 The model does not allow to make a distinction between small and large installations in the 
non energy intensive sectors.
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In Flanders, the share of renewable energy was about 2.9% in 2009 of which 
1.0% green electricity, 1.3% green heat (mainly wood stoves) and 0.6% biofu-
els (Aernouts K., 2010). 
Table 3: Primary Energy Consumption in the reference scenario (abs. in PJ and % share)
2010 2020 2030 2040
Coal 377 683 1013 1133
Oil 1123 1145 1264 1381
Natural gas 645 583 569 523
Nuclear 505 350 0 0
Hydro, wind, photovoltaic 8 14 14 14
Other renewables 12 12 12 12
Waste 16 20 21 23
Total 2685 2808 2893 3085
Coal 14.0% 24.3% 35.0% 36.7%
Oil 41.8% 40.8% 43.7% 44.8%
Natural gas 24.0% 20.8% 19.7% 16.9%
Nuclear 18.8% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Hydro, wind, photovoltaic 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4%
Other renewables 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Waste 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
The evolution in the primary energy consumption implies that the CO2 emis-
sions linked to energy increase. In 2020, they are 26% above the level of 2005 
and continue to increase thereafter, especially after 2025 when coal power 
plants should replace the nuclear power plants. Industry and transport re-
main the biggest emitters in the first period but the electricity sector becomes 
an important polluter when new coal power plants are installed.
Table 4: CO2 emissions in the reference scenario (Mio.ton and %)
2010 2020 2030 2040
share 
2010
share 
2020
share 
2030
share 
2040
Industry 48 59 64 70 40% 39% 35% 35%
Hous, Com & Agr 27 23 22 19 22% 16% 12% 9%
Transport 25 26 28 31 20% 17% 15% 15%
Electricity 17 37 67 76 14% 25% 36% 38%
Other supply 5 5 5 5 4% 3% 3% 2%
Total emissions 122 149 186 200 100% 100% 100% 100%
7
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4.  Construction of the scenarios
To evaluate the effect of the EU targets for Belgium, we consider 4 scenario’s, 
including the reference scenario. The Belgian Kyoto target and the nuclear 
phase-out are imposed in all scenarios. It is assumed that 7% of the reduction 
target in 2010 is achieved by buying permits abroad. Only CO2 emissions are 
considered as the other GHG are not yet modelled and the energy system is 
only responsible for a small part of the other GHG. Some variants have also 
been considered for the analysis, but they are only mentioned further in the 
text for reasons of clarity. Table 5 reproduces the definitions and the specific 
assumptions for the different scenario’s.
Table 5: Scenario definitions and assumptions
Scenario Definition
REF
Reference scenario with a CO2 price for ETS-sectors of 24 €/t after 
2020
REN Same as REF + 10% biofuel target + 13% Renewable target
CLIM
A CO2 price for ETS sectors of 39 €/t in 2020 and a CO2 emission 
constraint for non-ETS sectors 
CLIM_REN Same as CLIM + 10% biofuel target + 13% Renewable target
Scenario Assumptions Years
2010 2020 2050
REF and REN CO2 price for ETS sectors (€/ton) 20 24.2* 24.2*
CLIM and CLIM_REN
CO2 price for ETS sectors (€/ton) 20 39.1* 208
CO2 constraint non-ETS 
sectors (ref = 2005)
-8% -15% -39%**
REN and CLIM_REN
Biofuels target 10% 10%
Renewable energy target 13% 15%
* These values come from the Impact Assessment report of the European Commission on the 
Climate and Renewable Action Plan (EU, 2008); **Corresponds to 8 Mton extra reduction in the 
non-ETS sectors in 2050, compared to 2020
“REN” refers to the biofuel and renewable target imposed. Figure 2 gives the 
renewable target for Belgium from the EU and the minimum trajectory. In the 
model, targets were explicitly modelled only for 2015 and 2020. The formula 
for the computation of the renewable target % in the model is:
 • As numerator: electricity and heat (from CHP) produced by renewable 
technologies + renewable energy (not electricity or heat) in the final de-
mand sectors
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 • As denominator: total electricity and heat (from CHP) produced and total 
final demand (not electricity and heat)
Figure 2: Renewable target for Belgium and minimum trajectory
For technologies such as heat pumps, the implicit energy from air or ground 
was not taken into account although this energy is considered as green energy 
in the renewables Directive. However, the advantage of reducing the final 
energy by increasing the share of heat pumps, is incorporated in the model.
The scenario “CLIM_REN” is close to current EU climate policy. In this sce-
nario, the targets for the non-ETS sectors have been implemented. The model 
assumes an EU-wide CO2 price for the ETS sectors in line with the EC impact 
assessment (EC, 2008) in which a European model was used. 
As TIMES is a perfect foresight model, it is important to take into account the 
future beyond 2020. It was assumed that the effort for GHG reduction would 
continue, given the EU objective of limiting the temperature increase to no 
more than 2° Celsius. A carbon value gradually increasing to 208 €/ton CO2 
in 2050 was imposed on the ETS sectors and a reduction target of 37% for the 
non-ETS7 compared to 2005. For the renewable target, a share of 15% was im-
posed after 2020 while the biofuel target remains at 10%. The importance of 
these two specific targets decreases with the stringency of the climate target, 
as will be seen in the results.
8 The target for non-ETS and the ETS carbon value were fixed such as to achieve a certain con-
vergence between the non-ETS and ETS carbon value by the end of the horizon.
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5.  Results
5.1  The energy system welfare cost
The total welfare cost of the alternative scenarios is shown in table 6 and 7. 
The cost is the additional cost of alternative scenarios in comparison with the 
reference scenario. As the level of demand for energy services can change, the 
welfare cost equals the change in the sum of consumer and producer surplus. 
It does not take into account possible side benefits through the reduction of 
other external costs linked to energy use. Neither does it include the derived 
effects on other markets which depend on the policy instrument used8.
The result in the first column of table 6 is the relative change of the total dis-
counted energy system cost in TIMES over the entire modelling period until 
2050. The result in the second column shows this cost as a ratio to the esti-
mated GDP for Belgium in 2010 (Eurostat).
Another way of representing the additional cost is to annualise it with a dis-
count rate of 4% and then relate it to the estimated GDP of 2010, as shown 
in the next table. This is a yearly equivalent annual cost. The additional cost 
varies from year to year as shown in the last columns.
Table 6: Total discounted welfare cost (loss of consumer/producer surplus), compared to REF
%DIF %GDP2010
REN 5.5% 1.4%
CLIM 16.2% 4.2%
CLIM_REN 17.5% 4.5%
Table 7: Total annualised (averaged) welfare cost and undiscounted welfare cost
 Undiscounted cost [M€/an]
 
Annualised
[M€]
Annualised
%GDP2010
2020 2030 2040
REN 853 0.25% 1702 1736 2008
CLIM 2518 0.73% 1898 5860 8610
CLIM_REN 2719 0.78% 2770 6171 8803
8 Changes in the tax revenue and the costs specifically associated to the change in market distor-
tions in other sectors - Cf. double dividend literature.
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It can be seen from the results that the CO2 reduction scenarios CLIM and 
CLIM_REN are close in terms of cost. Imposing a renewable target on top of 
the climate target increases the total system cost but the additional cost is limi-
ted. The cost increase is not more than 0.05 % of GDP2010 in annualised terms 
(see table 7). This additional cost corresponds, on average, to an increase of 
the energy system cost by some 8%. In terms of the annual system cost in 2020, 
the cost increase is much higher. The additional cost in 2020 increases from 
about 1.9 B€ to 2.8 B€, an increase of nearly 50%. However, it still represents 
only 4% compared to the reference in 2020. After 2020 the annual additional 
costs remain small. 
This is also reflected in the renewable shadow price in table 8. For 2020, the 
marginal cost of the renewable target is in “CLIM_REN” almost equal to the 
marginal cost in the scenario “REN” where there is no climate constraint. The 
renewable target of 13% is clearly dominating the climate target here. The CO2 
price for the non ETS sectors (the shadow price of the CO2 constraint) is even 
zero in 2020. The reason is that the renewable target is forcing the CO2 emis-
sions below the target for the non-ETS sectors. If there is no renewable target, 
the shadow price of the non-ETS target has a price of 22 €/t CO2. Apparently, 
there are some cheap options in the non-ETS sectors for the renewable target, 
mainly reducing the final energy demand in the commercial sector. The CO2 
price for the ETS does not change as it was assumed fixed.
After 2030, the renewable shadow price is very low. The reason is that rene-
wable energy is, in the longer term, a cost efficient option when climate policy 
is the only objective.
Table 8: Shadow price of the targets and CO2 price imposed in the ETS
2010 2020 2030 2040
Shadow price of renewable target (€/MWh)
REN 0 55 46 63
CLIM_REN 0 56 0 2
Shadow price of CO2 constraint non-ETS (€/t CO2)
CLIM 29 22 117 150
CLIM_REN 30 0 92 159
Shadow price of biofuel target (€/MWh)
REN, CLIM, CLIM_REN 0 0 0 0
Price of CO2 ETS (€/t CO2)
REN 20 24 24 24
CLIM 20 39 103 155
CLIM_REN 20 39 103 155
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The shadow price of the biofuel target is zero: the share of biofuels reaches 
12.7%, so above the 10% target. A scenario with only the 13% renewable tar-
get and without biofuel target gives the same results. Increasing the share 
of biofuels is a good option for reducing the CO2 emissions (shadow price 
zero in CLIM) and for increasing the renewables share when more stringent 
renewable targets are imposed. A variant of the CLIM_REN scenario was cre-
ated with only the biofuel target, thus without the overall renewable energy 
target. In this variant, the biofuel target is binding and the shadow price of the 
constraint amounts to 36 €/MWh in 2020. 
A second variant of the CLIM_REN scenario has been constructed to test the 
assumption of distinguishing ETS and non-ETS sectors. Imposing an overall 
CO2 price instead of distinguishing ETS and non-ETS sectors does not influen-
ce much the cost. This is an indication that the target of 15% reduction for the 
non-ETS sectors is close to an overall cost efficient solution. The renewable va-
lue decreases from 56€/MWh to 31€/MWh in 2020, because in this variant, 
the CO2 emissions of the non-ETS sectors have a price in 2020. The differences 
disappear rapidly after 2025.
5.2  CO2 emissions and energy consumption
The CO2 emissions for the different scenarios are given in the table below. The 
CO2 emissions are not reduced much when only the renewable and biofuel 
targets are imposed without any climate target, especially in the long term. A 
policy targeted only on renewable energy alone is not enough for the climate 
target as it does not induce a sufficient CO2 emissions reduction. Adding the 
renewable target to the climate policy reduces the emissions in 2020 with an 
additional 4%-point.
Table 9: CO2 emissions in the different scenarios (in Mio.t and percentage reduction)
2010 2020 2030 2040
REF 122 149 186 200
REN 121 124 161 173
CLIM 119 107 89 80
CLIM_REN 119 101 87 79
REN -1% -17% -14% -14%
CLIM -3% -28% -52% -60%
CLIM_REN -3% -32% -53% -61%
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The contribution of ETS and non-ETS sectors in these emission reductions is 
analysed in the figure below. Both ETS and non-ETS sectors contribute to the 
reduction target, except in the REN scenario. 
Figure 3: CO2 emissions in the ETS (left) and non-ETS sectors (right)
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The primary energy consumption decreases with the climate target and there 
is a substitution away from coal to gas and renewables. The shift towards re-
newables is more pronounced when there is a specific renewable target.
Table 10: Primary energy consumption (PJ) (difference compared to reference)
CLIM CLIM_REN
2010 2020 2030 2040 2010 2020 2030 2040
Coal -15 -422 -799 -958 -15 -430 -813 -970
Oil -24 -12 -53 -99 -24 -65 -72 -100
Natural gas 20 213 368 443 20 84 340 412
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Biomass, hydro, wind, photovoltaic 0 48 164 248 0 240 256 273
Waste 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0
Total -18 -173 -319 -366 -19 -171 -289 -386
The share of renewables (as computed for the renewable target) is given in 
the table below. Here again one can see the impact of the renewable target 
in 2020 where the share is more than doubled. After 2020, the climate target 
leads by itself to an increase in the renewable share without however going 
much beyond 13%. 
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Table 11: Share of renewables (computed as for the renewable target)
2010 2020 2030 2040
REF 1.1% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3%
REN 1.2% 13.0% 13.7% 14.4%
CLIM 1.2% 4.3% 9.8% 12.7%
CLIM_REN 1.2% 13.0% 13.7% 14.4%
5.3  Technological options for renewable energy
Imposing a renewable target leads mainly to a more rapid penetration of the 
technologies based on renewables, such as biomass for heat and CHP. In the 
electricity sector, the full potential for wind off shore of 3800 MWel is used 
from 2020 onwards. A very high growth rate of the capacity of wind turbines 
off shore is needed in such scenario. In the absence of a renewable target, 
part of the emission reductions in the electricity sector were obtained through 
carbon capture and storage and these are replaced by emission reduction th-
rough renewables whenever a renewable target is imposed. 
When the target for renewable increases, biofuels for transport are penetra-
ting more rapidly, first ethanol and then biodiesel9, until the maximum po-
tential is used.
The potentials imposed on domestic production for biocrops and wood play 
an important role in these results and should be further examined with sen-
sitivity studies. 
Table 12 gives the results for the CLIM_REN scenario with a 13% and 20% 
share of renewable energy. The tables makes a distinction between green ele-
ctricity (ELC) and other green energy (Non-ELC), thus green heat and biofu-
els.
9 Mixing biofuels with  oilfuels can be seen as a first step to a more generalised use, cars on 
biofuels being more efficient.
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Table 12: Technological option for renewable in a CO2-scenario with 13% and 20% renewable 
target in 2020 (PJ)
Scenario CLIM_REN13 CLIM_REN20
Process ELC Non-ELC ELC Non-ELC
CHP Steam Turb. condensing WOOD Chemistry 0.1 0.2 0 0
CHP Steam Turb. condensing WOOD Non Ferro 2.6 4.5 1.5 2.6
CHP Int. Combust. Biogas Other 0 0 0.3 0.5
CHP Steam Turb. condensing WOOD Other 24.1 42.0 7.4 12.9
CHP Int. Combust. Biogas Paper 0.4 0.5 5.9 7.6
CHP Steam Turb. condensing WOOD Paper 4.1 7.1 0 0
CHP Int. Combust. Biogas Refineries 0 0 0.1 0.1
CHP Steam Turb condensing WOOD Refineries 0 0 2.3 4.0
Hydro 1.6 0 1.6 0
Hydro New 0.9 0 0.9 0
PV Plant Size 0 0 31.0 0
Wind Base-year 0.1 0 0.1 0
Wind Offshore Close 6.9 0 6.9 0
Wind Offshore Medium 3.5 0 3.5 0
Wind Offshore Far 33.4 0 33.4 0
Wind Onshore High 5.5 0 5.5 0
Wind Onshore Medium 5.6 0 5.6 0
Wind Onshore Low 1.5 0 1.5 0
Industrial Wood Heating 0 1.5 0 73.0
Residential Wood Heating 0 8.0 0 0
Biodiesel for Transport 0 0.0 0 41.0
Ethanol for Transport 0 44.9 0 44.9
Total Electricity and non-electricity 90.2 108.7 107.4 186.6
TOTAL 198.9 293.9
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5.4 Impact on electricity price for households
As an example of the impact of the climate and energy policy on the energy 
price, the evolution in the electricity price in the residential sector is repro-
duced in the table and graph below. A fix transport and distribution cost is 
assumed. The total electricity price increases with the stringency of the targets 
and here again the impact of the renewable target is reflected mainly in 2020 
and 2025. The impact of the renewable target is lower than the impact of ha-
ving the climate policy alone. In contrast to REF, REF_NOCLIM is a scenario 
without a tax for CO2.
Table 13: Electricity price for households (compared to 2010 if no climate policy)
2020 2030 2040
REF_NOCLIM 2% 2% 5%
REF 16% 15% 16%
REN 16% 21% 27%
CLIM 14% 35% 48%
CLIM_REN 15% 41% 48%
Figure 4: Relative electricity price for households (compared to the price in 2000)
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5.5 Impact of the renewable target
For a specific evaluation of the renewable target for Belgium, different runs of 
the CLIM_REN scenario were done with a renewable target going from 10% 
to 20% in 2020. For the period after 2020, the target is slightly increased as can 
be seen in the table below. The other policies are assumed fixed. 
Table 14: Share of renewable energy
2010 2020 2030 2040
CLIM_REN10 1.16% 10.0% 10.9% 12.7%
CLIM_REN11 1.16% 11.0% 12.4% 13.7%
CLIM_REN12 1.16% 12.0% 13.0% 14.0%
CLIM_REN 1.16% 13.0% 13.8% 14.4%
CLIM_REN15 1.20% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%
CLIM_REN17 1.21% 17.0% 17.0% 17.1%
CLIM_REN20 1.15% 20.0% 21.7% 23.4%
With the increasing target on renewable, the share of biofuels (which are one 
of the available options) increases also, as seen in the next table. For a re-
newable target of 13% or more, the cost efficient share of biofuels is more than 
10%. For a renewable target of 12% or less, the cost efficient share of biofuels 
is less than 10%.
Table 15: Share of biofuels in transport
2010 2020 2030 2040
CLIM_REN10 0% 10.0% 10.0% 13.6%
CLIM_REN11 0% 10.0% 10.6% 13.6%
CLIM_REN12 0% 10.0% 10.0% 13.6%
CLIM_REN 0% 12.7% 12.3% 13.6%
CLIM_REN15 0% 15.7% 13.1% 13.6%
CLIM_REN17 0% 16.9% 13.8% 13.7%
CLIM_REN20 0% 24.8% 25.3% 26.2%
Table 16 shows the shadow price of the non-ETS CO2 target. With a renewable 
target above 13%, the increase in the shadow price of CO2 is shifted towards 
the later periods.
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Table 16: Shadow price of the non-ETS CO2 target (€/ton CO2)
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
CLIM_REN10 29 40 0 39 109 134 157
CLIM_REN11 29 41 0 37 100 133 157
CLIM_REN12 29 41 0 31 110 133 156
CLIM_REN 30 42 0 0 92 133 159
CLIM_REN15 26 35 0 0 35 72 158
CLIM_REN17 26 29 0 0 25 67 161
CLIM_REN20 26 27 0 0 0 0 0
The shadow prices of the renewable constraint are illustrated in Figure 5. The 
shadow prices increase from 20-30 €/MWh to 90-100 €/MWh when increa-
sing the target to 20%. Beyond 2020, it becomes very costly to impose a target 
above 13%. Numbers are averaged for the period 2020-2025 and for the period 
2030-2035. They represent the marginal cost of an extra MWh of renewable 
energy that is imposed, given that there is already a CO2 constraint. The mar-
ginal cost decreases over time because of the assumed policy for CO2, except 
for a stringent renewable target of more than 17%. 
One can also compare these results with assumed prices for a EU-green certi-
ficate. Assuming a liquid market in guarantees of origin for renewable energy, 
there would be one price for a EU-green certificate. For example with an inter-
national price of 50 €/MWh, it would be cost efficient to have 13% and 17% of 
renewable energy in Belgium in respectively 2020-2025 and 2030-2035, given 
the climate policy imposed.
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Figure 5: Shadow price of renewable target for the scenario CLIM_REN averaged for 2020-
2025 and 2030-2035
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In Figure 6, the black line represents the additional annual cost in the year 
2020 compared to the situation where a 13% target is imposed. The other mar-
ginal cost curve is linear and represents the opportunity cost assuming an 
international price of a green certificate of 50 €/MWh. The cost of a target 
for a Member State is after all the price of an international green certificate 
multiplied with the target. With renewable shares that are higher than 13%, 
the average additional annual cost for one extra percentage of green energy 
amounts to 350 M€ (rounded). This conclusion is only valid for 2020, since it 
has been shown that the marginal cost decreases rapidly after 2025.
These computations have been based on the CLIM_REN scenario that assu-
mes a fixed, exogenous price for the ETS sectors. A fixed price of carbon for 
the ETS sectors is an important assumption in our policy scenarios where po-
licies overlap. An endogenous carbon price (at EU level) generates different 
results. Sensitivity analysis with the Belgian model shows that the additional 
cost of a 20% renewable target is 20% lower. It also shows that the results on 
the marginal cost for renewable energy are not very different when the carbon 
price is made endogenous. 
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Figure 6: Additional annual cost in 2020 compared to the proposed 13% renewable target
6.  Conclusions
The conclusions in this chapter are clearly dependent on the modelling as-
sumptions and on the cost and technology assumptions used. 
For the total period (2010-2050), the addition of a renewable and biofuel target 
on top of the climate target increases only slightly the total cost of a climate 
only policy. This increase is however mostly concentrated around 2020 and 
can then be substantial compared to the no renewable case. The addition of 
the renewable target represents an increase of the annual cost of the energy 
system of some 4% compared to the reference in 2020.
The imposition of the renewable target implies that the non-ETS CO2 target 
is achieved without any specific CO2 emission additional reduction efforts in 
this sector. 
After 2020, the policy for renewable energy only increases slightly the cost of 
achieving the Belgian climate target as a limited introduction of renewables 
is part of a cost effective climate policy. As renewable technologies are still in 
their development phase, the renewable targets could contribute to more in-
novation in renewable energy and contribute as such to future more stringent 
climate targets. It could also induce other external benefits (air pollution etc). 
When renewable certificates become tradable and one can rely on a long-term 
European price for green energy certificates of about 50 €/MWh, it would be 
cost efficient to have 13% and 17% of renewable energy in Belgium in respec-
tively 2020-2025 and 2030-2035, given the climate policy imposed.
The biofuel target in transport is only binding when imposed without the 
renewable or climate target, the biofuel option being one of the options to 
reach the renewable target. Its share reaches approx 12% with the renewable 
target. Though the assumptions regarding the potential for biofuels for Bel-
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gium are rather conservative, the side effects of the use of biofuels in terms of 
biodiversity, food production, etc. if extended at EU/World level need further 
examination.
A policy targeted on renewable energy alone is insufficient to reach the clima-
te target.
We have shown that the climate and renewable policies interact and that the 
cost of additional climate or renewable efforts can only be specified when 
both constraints are clearly specified. While both the climate target and the re-
newable target contribute to the reduction of the CO2 emissions, the technolo-
gical choice they induce can be different, e.g. carbon capture versus electricity 
production from renewables. 
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